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I. INTRODUCTION
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,1 Justice Thomas criticized an
existing Supreme Court doctrine regarding the “tiers of scrutiny,” quoting a
passage from an earlier Justice Scalia dissent that the “three basic tiers—
‘rational basis,’ intermediate, and strict scrutiny—‘are [1] no more scientific
than their names suggests, and [2] a further element of randomness is added
by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will be applied in each case.’”
Justice Thomas added: “But the problem now goes beyond that. If our
recent cases illustrate anything, it is how easily [3] the Court tinkers with
levels of scrutiny to achieve its desired result.”2
In three recent related articles, I have discussed a predictable and
principled structure to make “more scientific” the rational basis,3
intermediate review,4 and strict scrutiny5 “tiers” of review. These articles
1. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (quoting United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
2. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Rational Basis and Reasonableness Review, 45 S. ILL. U. L.J.
(forthcoming 2021), https://libguides.stcl.edu/ld.php?content_id=56631179 [https://perma.cc/
4WJ3-E7NW].
3. Id.
4. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Intermediate Review, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming
2021), https://libguides.stcl.edu/ld.php?content_id=56631192 [https://perma.cc/KB8T-422P].
5. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Strict Scrutiny Review (2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://libguides.stcl.edu/ld.php?content_id=56631214 [https://perma.cc/GTL6-T4DR].
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addressed Justice Thomas’s concerns about the scientific nature of the
standards of review. This Article responds to Justice Thomas’s concerns
about the manipulability of which standard to apply by discussing: (1) a
principled approach to when the Court should apply a rational basis,
intermediate review, or strict scrutiny review; and (2) why the Court’s
current approach is better than competing alternatives.
In pursuit of objective (1), Part II of this Article summarizes the existing
standards of review.6 Part III then discusses the various factors the
Supreme Court uses to determine whether to apply a particular standard of
review.7 Part IV provides an analysis of why the Court’s current decision
making regarding what standard of review to apply is sound and defensible
as reflecting reasoned decision making.8
In pursuit of objective (2), Part V discusses competing alternatives to the
current standards of review approach, such as a “sliding scale” approach9
or a single-standard “proportionality” approach,10 and why, in general, in
the American constitutional context the current standards of review
approach is better than these alternatives.11 Part VI then discusses how
more explicit acknowledgement of a background commitment to reasoned
decision making would improve the Court’s current approach.12 Part VII
discusses why that commitment to reasoned decision making supports
interpretation based on the original meaning of the concepts used in the
Constitution,13 and such interpretation reflects the original intent of the
framers and ratifiers.14 Part VIII provides a brief conclusion.15

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra text accompanying notes 16–82.
See infra text accompanying notes 83–148.
See infra text accompanying notes 149–274.
See infra text accompanying notes 275–89.
See infra text accompanying notes 283–306.
See infra text accompanying notes 307–22.
See infra text accompanying notes 315–436.
See infra text accompanying notes 437–60.
See infra text accompanying notes 461–74.
See infra text accompanying notes 475–78.
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II. SUMMARY OF THE BASIC STANDARDS OF REVIEW: RATIONAL BASIS,
REASONABLENESS REVIEW, INTERMEDIATE REVIEW, OR STRICT SCRUTINY
A. Standards of Review
Under rational review, which is used to review standard social or
economic legislation under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,
the government action need only (1) advance legitimate government
interests, (2) be rationally related to advancing these interests (e.g., not be
irrationally underinclusive or fail to advance any legitimate interest), and
(3) not impose irrational burdens on individuals (e.g., not be irrationally
overinclusive or burden individuals for no benefit).16 In addition, the Court
sometimes uses a higher level of legitimate government interest review. This
level, which can be called “reasonableness balancing” or “second-order
reasonableness review,” balances the extent of the government’s legitimate
interests against the burden on the individual to determine whether, given
this burden, the challenger can show the government regulation is
“unreasonable” or “clearly excessive.”17
Sometimes the Court has shifted the burden to the government in these
legitimate government interest cases to prove the government action is
Because requiring the government to justify the
“reasonable.”18
constitutionality of its action makes this standard of review more difficult
for the government to meet, it can be called “heightened reasonableness
balancing” or “[third]-order reasonableness review.”19 Notably, both of
these reasonableness balancing tests are less rigorous than intermediate
review, discussed next, for two reasons: (1) legitimate interests can be used

16. See generally Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 6–12 nn.41–76) (discussing Rational Basis
Review in the context of Equal Protection and Due Process); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 699–702 (5th ed. 2015) (“Rational basis review is
the minimum level of scrutiny that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet.”).
17. For a full discussion of the difference between minimum rationality review and
reasonableness balancing, see Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 12–16 nn.77–96) (citing Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)) (discussing a case involving fundamental right to vote/access to
ballot); Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 35–47 nn.215–02) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970) (discussing a Dormant Commerce Clause case using “clearly excessive” language);
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (discussing a right of access to ballot case using “reasonableness” standard);
BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–85 (1996) (highlighting the “grossly excessive” language used).
18. See Kelso, supra note 2, (manuscript at 51–56 nn.303–334) (citing Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 388–91 (1994)) (discussing a Takings Clause case); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568,
572 n.4 (1968) (arguing the right of government workers to speak on matters of public concern).
19. Kelso, supra note 2, (manuscript at 16 nn.98–100, 53–56 nn.303–34).
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to make the government action constitutional under reasonableness
balancing, not the intermediate requirement of important or substantial
interests; and (2) under reasonableness balancing there are not independent
requirements the government action be “substantially related” to advancing
the interests and be “not substantially too burdensome” as under
intermediate review, but only a balancing of benefits and burdens to
determine if the action is reasonable.20
In contrast, the legislation under review must “(1) advance important . . .
or substantial government ends, . . .; (2) [be] substantially related to
advancing [these] ends, . . .; and (3) [not be] substantially more burdensome
than necessary to advance these ends.”21 There is also a heightened
intermediate review standard used in cases involving commercial speech.
Under commercial speech doctrine, while adopting the same intermediate
tests for prongs (1) and (3), under prong (2) the test for commercial speech
requires the government means be “directly related” to advancing the
government’s interests, which is the strict scrutiny standard of review, and
not merely be substantially related.22
Under strict scrutiny, the statute must (1) advance compelling
governmental ends; (2) be directly related to advancing these ends; and
(3) be the least restrictive effective means to advance the ends.23 There is
20. For a discussion of the intermediate standard of review, see infra text accompanying
notes 21–22. It is also notable the second-order reasonableness balancing is less rigorous than
intermediate review for a third reason: the burden is on the challenger to prove unconstitutionality, not
the burden on the government to justify the action as under intermediate review, as noted infra text
accompanying notes 25–26.
21. See generally Kelso, supra note 4 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976));
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 699 (“Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is upheld if it is substantially
related to an important government purpose . . . . The means used need not be necessary but must
have a ‘substantial relationship’ to the end being sought.”).
22. See Kelso, supra note 4, (manuscript at 32–38 nn.207–46) (citing, inter alia, Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). For the strict scrutiny standard of
review, see infra text accompanying note 23. The article cited here also discussed four “mutated” forms
of intermediate review that have appeared in Supreme Court cases. Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript
at 38–58 nn.247–348). The article suggested each of these four mutations, as well as other problematic
dicta in a few other Supreme Court cases, should be rejected in favor of the two well-established forms
of intermediate review represented by Boren, 429 U.S. at 190, and Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
See Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript at 58–63 nn.349–80).
23. See Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5–22 nn.39–150) (discussing the basic elements of
strict scrutiny review); CHEMERINKSY, supra note 16, at 699 (“Under strict scrutiny, a law is upheld if
it is proved necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. The government . . . must show
that it cannot achieve its objective through any less discriminatory alternative.”). The Kelso article
cited here discussed applications of strict scrutiny review in a number of contexts like (1) racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, see Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 22–33
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also a form of “loose” strict scrutiny approach, which adopts prongs (1)
and (2) of strict scrutiny, but prong (3) of intermediate review.24
Under current doctrine, the challenger bears the burden of proving
unconstitutionality under either minimum rationality review or under
second-order reasonableness balancing.25 The government bears the
burden of justifying its action under third-order reasonableness balancing,
intermediate review, or strict scrutiny, the government bears the burden of
justifying its action.26 While “any reasonably conceivable interest” can “be
used to justify a statute at minimum rationality review,”27 and any
reasonably conceivable government interest “’put forward by the
nn.151–208); (2) substantial burdens on fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause, Kelso, supra
note 5 (manuscript at 33–37 nn.209–34); or (3) various kinds of cases under the First Amendment,
Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 37–41 nn.235–60).
24. Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 48–50 nn.301–08) (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
956–59 (1996)) (discussing racial redistricting challenges under the Equal Protection Clause).
Following this discussion, the article then discussed four “mutations” of strict scrutiny that have
appeared in some cases: (1) a “hybrid” kind of intermediate/strict scrutiny review; (2) a “watereddown” kind of strict scrutiny; (3) suggestion of “extremely limited” possibilities for compelling interests
to satisfy strict scrutiny; and (4) suggestion of a “categorical” approach of unconstitutionally when
traditionally strict scrutiny has been applied. Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 52–72 nn.321–440).
The article proposed any hybrid kind of intermediate/strict scrutiny should adopt one of the two
well-established forms of intermediate review or two well-established forms of strict scrutiny. Kelso,
supra note 5 (manuscript at 72–73 nn.441–42). The article also proposed that the remaining
(2)–(4) variations of strict scrutiny should just adopt standard strict scrutiny review. Kelso, supra note 5
(manuscript at 73 nn.443–44).
25. Regarding the burden of proof under minimum rationality review, see CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 16, at 706–07 (stating “[t]he challenger has the burden on proof when rational basis review
[is applied]”). See also id. at 700 (“State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power . . . .” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961))). Regarding
the burden of proof under “reasonableness balancing,” see, e.g., Burdick v. Takashi, 504 U.S. 428, 434,
437–38, 441–42 (1992), for a discussion on the burden of proof on challenger, as the Court “rejected
the petitioner’s argument.”
26. Under intermediate review, the government has the burden to justify its course of action.
CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1101 n.82 (2007
& Supp. 2020) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 529 (1996)), https://libguides.stcl.edu/
ld.php?content_id=36280424 [https://perma.cc/DUF4-786F]. Similarly, under strict scrutiny, the
government has the burden to justify its course of action. Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989)). The burden is also on the government in cases of heightened reasonableness
balancing. See Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 47–53 nn.283–316) (citing Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 388–91 (1994)) (discussing a Takings Clause case); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)
(discussing a Dormant Commerce Clause case); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 572 n.4
(1968) (analyzing the right of government workers to speak on matters of public concern).
27. See 1–2 CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
AN E-COURSEBOOK, at 54 n.26 (2020 Orig. Ed. 2014) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320
(1993)), https://libguides.stcl.edu/ld.php?content_id=32389692 [https://perma.cc/DUF4-786F].
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government’ in litigation” can be used where reasonableness balancing
applies,28 at intermediate review the government can only use “plausible”
or “actual” government purposes to justify its action,29 while at strict
scrutiny the government can only use actual government purposes to meet
its burden of satisfying strict scrutiny.30
B. Potential Problems from Not Acknowledging These Standards of Review
Given this understanding of the Court’s current practice, there are seven
clear standards of review of the constitutionality of governmental action:
rational review; two kinds of reasonableness balancing; two kinds of
intermediate review, and two kinds of strict scrutiny.31 “[A] danger of
increased confusion and unpredictability exists if the proliferation of levels
continues. This could happen if:
1) The Court adopts additional kinds of inquiries different than the
three basic inquiries used under minimum rational review,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny;

28. See Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 13–14 nn.81–85) (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434)
(“A court . . . must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury’ . . . against ‘the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications’ . . .” (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434)). For a
discussion where reasonableness balancing applies, see Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 35–47
nn.215–82).
29. See Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript at 10 n.67) (citing KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26,
at 1103–1104 nn.92–99); KELSO & KELSO, supra note 27, at 55–62 nn.31–36; Michael M. v. Super. Ct.,
450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981), quoted in Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript at 10 n.67) (considering whether a
governmental interest “could have plausibly motivated an impartial legislature”); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 199 n.7 (1976), quoted in Kelso, supra note 4, (manuscript at 10 n.67) (discussing use of a
government purpose while acknowledging whether “this was the true purpose is not all self-evident.”).
30. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 1102 nn.85–86; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 n.4
(1996) (“To be a compelling interest, the State must show that the alleged objective was the legislature’s
‘actual purpose . . . .’”). For a discussion of what kinds of interests constitute compelling, substantial,
or legitimate interests, see Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 9–1 nn.59–76). For a discussion of
illegitimate interests, see Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 8 nn.56). For a discussion explaining
decisions regarding illegitimate interests considering a commitment to reasoned decision making, see
infra text accompanying notes 327–47.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 16–30. These seven standards are summarized in
Appendix A to this Article. Appendix B to this Article summarizes in which constitutional doctrines
each of these seven standards are currently used. On these seven standards of review, see also R. Randall
Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting
Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225,
227–37, 258–59 (2002).
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2) Additional mixings and matchings occur for different kinds of
scrutiny for the governmental interests, relationship to benefits, and
burden inquiries; or”
3) These seven standards—the “base” level of rational review and the
“plus six” additional standards of review—are not clearly
acknowledged.
Each of these concerns are real given some language in Supreme Court
cases. They are discussed next.32
1.

Adopting Additional Kind of Inquiries

Two cases underscore the kind of problem the possible proliferation of
additional kinds of inquiries can create. First, in the context of reviewing
the constitutionality of a court injunction, the Court in Madsen v. Women’s
Health Center, Inc.33 adopted an analysis under prong (3) of heightened
scrutiny described as somewhere between the intermediate “not
substantially more burdensome” test and the strict scrutiny “least restrictive
alternative” test. From the opinion, it was not clear exactly how much more
stringent this test was than traditional intermediate scrutiny, nor were other
precedents of any help since the standard was not used in any other case.
As the dissent noted in Madsen, “[t]he Court . . . creates, brand new[,] . . . an
additional standard . . . . The difference between it and intermediate
scrutiny . . . is frankly too subtle for me to describe . . . .”34 In fact, the
result in Madsen is consistent with applying the heightened intermediate
review standard used in commercial speech cases under Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.35 Thus, if one agrees
that higher scrutiny is appropriate for court injunctions rather than for other
kinds of governmental action, as the majority held in Madsen,36 there is a
predictable standard of review that has been used in many other cases that
could be adopted.
32. The discussion in this section is an updated version of concerns expressed in 2002 in Kelso,
supra note 31, at 237–46.
33. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
34. Id. at 791 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. See Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript at 57–58 nn.339–48). The elements of the Central Hudson
test are noted at supra text accompanying note 22.
36. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765–66 (distinguishing ordinances from court-imposed injunctions,
particularly the collateral bar rule, and noting that “these differences require a somewhat more stringent
application of general First Amendment principles” for injunctions).
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The gender discrimination case of United States v. Virginia37 is another
case of a potential increased proliferation of inquiries leading to an
unnecessarily confused result. Although Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion initially cited standard intermediate review language as the
appropriate standard to apply in a gender discrimination case,38 the opinion
ultimately seemed to require the State of Virginia show an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for its gender discrimination at the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI), not merely a substantial relationship to
important government interests.39 As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his
concurring opinion, adoption of the phrase “exceedingly persuasive
justification . . . introduces an element of uncertainty” and “potential
confusion” into the appropriate test, and is unnecessary to strike down the
gender discrimination at issue at VMI.40 Fortunately, in gender
discrimination cases since Virginia, the Court has tended to use standard
intermediate scrutiny language.41 Thus, the Court avoided throwing an
additional idiosyncratic test—exceedingly persuasive analysis—into the
mix.42
2.

Problems of Mixing and Matching Elements of Levels of Scrutiny

In addition to the versions of rational review discussed earlier in this
article,43 it would be possible for the Court to add levels of review mixing
rational review and intermediate review. For example, the Court could
suggest the government action must have a rational relationship to an

37. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
38. Id. at 533 (first alteration in original) (requiring “the [challenged] classification serve[]
‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.’” (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982))).
39. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534.
40. Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
41. See Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript at 54 nn.321–24), (citing Kevin N. Rolando, Notes and
Comments, A Decade Later: United States v. Virginia and the Rise and Fall of “Skeptical Scrutiny,”
12 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 182, 207 (2006)).
42. Like the “burden no more speech than necessary” language in Madsen, the “exceedingly
persuasive justification” language in United States v. Virginia is idiosyncratic since it is not an established
test used in any other area of the law. If the Court in Virginia had adopted, for example, a strict scrutiny
test of “least burdensome effective alternative,” but continued the important, but not compelling
government interest analysis of intermediate review that would have created unnecessary proliferation
problems of its own by adding an additional kind of review frustrating the stepladder approach of the
current seven levels of review. See infra text accompanying notes 51–64.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 16–20.
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important or substantial government interest. The Court appears to have
done this in a voting rights case, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.44
The Court could also suggest that the government action must have a
substantial relationship to a legitimate government interest. The Court
appears to have done this in the Takings Clause case of City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes.45
Each of these decisions is troublesome by creating additional kinds of
tests without demonstrating need for them. Fortunately, the Court has
pulled back from these assertions. In Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.,46 a
unanimous Supreme Court explicitly rejected the language in City of Monterey
and said that in the future general government regulation affecting property
rights should be analyzed under the standard Takings Clause language of
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,47 which adopts a
reasonable balancing approach, with no “substantial advancement”
requirement.48 In voting rights/ ballot access cases after Timmons, the Court
has not focused on whether the government interests are “important” or
“substantial,” but instead has used “legitimate” government interests to
support the constitutionality of the government’s action.49 Thus, this

44. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 369–70 (1997) (“[A] State’s
important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions.”).
45. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999) (“[A]lthough this Court
has provided neither a definitive statement of the elements of a claim for a temporary regulatory taking
nor a thorough explanation of the nature or applicability of the requirement that a regulation
substantially advance legitimate public interests outside the context of required dedications or exactions
. . . . Given the posture of the case before us, we decline the suggestions of amici to revisit these
precedents.”). This “substantially advance” language appeared in some earlier Takings Clause cases,
see for example Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1980).
46. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–48 (2005).
47. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
48. This decision is consistent with the call for rejecting the “substantially advance” language in
Takings Clause cases in Kelso, supra note 31, at 249–50.
49. See, e.g., Crawford v. Indiana, 553 U.S. 181, 188–89 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding an
Indiana voter identification law requiring citizens voting in person on election day or casting a ballot
in person with the clerk prior to election day, to present government issued photo identification.
Voters who lack proper identification could cast a provisional ballot, and then meet the statute’s
requirement within ten days following the election.). In his opinion, Justice Stevens said that however
slight the burden may appear, it must be justified by legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to
justify the limitations. Id. at 191. This is consistent with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992),
whereby substantial burdens on voting rights trigger strict scrutiny, but less burdens trigger secondorder rational review, where the test is whether the regulation is unreasonable or excessively
burdensome. Justice Stevens concluded in Crawford the state’s interest in deterring and detecting voter
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potential anomaly seems to have been properly avoided.50
Given the three basic inquiries of governmental ends, relationship to
benefits, and burdens, and three levels of scrutiny for each inquiry (i.e.,
legitimate, important, or compelling governmental ends; rational,
substantial, or direct relationship to benefits; and not irrationally
burdensome, not substantially more burdensome than necessary, or least
restrictive alternative),51 mathematically this creates twenty-seven possible
permutations of levels of review (3 x 3 x 3). With the addition at rational
review of the balancing tests of second-order and third-order
reasonableness review;52 their various linguistic variations (e.g., viewing
unreasonable, “not reasonable and necessary,” clearly excessive, and
“grossly excessive” as different levels of rigor);53 the possibility of placing
the burden of proof on the challenger or the government in any of these
levels of scrutiny;54 and the different sources that could be used to justify
government action (“any reasonably conceivable” basis, any “reasonably
conceivable basis put forward in litigation,” “plausible or actual” interests,
or actual interests only),55 the number of possible permutations rises to
more than 200.56

fraud, modernizing voting procedures, and safeguarding voter confidence justified the photo
requirement, and given the evidence the challengers presented, it was not excessively burdensome on
any class of voters. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191–200.
50. In his concurring opinion, although Justice Scalia phrased the Burdick test as involving
“important regulatory interests”, he also noted it was a “deferential standard.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204
(Scalia, J., concurring). As with Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), instead of
phrasing the test as intermediate “important” interests, but then using the word “deferential,” it would
be better to phrase the test as second-order reasonableness review, asking if the government’s
legitimate interests are excessively burdensome, as done in the plurality opinion, as argued in Kelso,
supra note 31, at 249–89. In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded the state
interests failed to justify the limitations travel costs and fees needed for acquiring a photo, particularly
for the poor or old, placed on the right to vote. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 210–16, 218–23 (Souter, J., joined
by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer similarly concluded the statute was
unconstitutional for imposing a disproportionate burden on eligible voters who lack a driver’s license
or other statutorily valid forms of photo ID. Id. at 237–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. See supra note 16, 21–24 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
56. With twenty-seven permutations of the three basic levels of review multiplied by two
possibilities for burden of proof multiplied by four possible different sources to consider, this yields
216 different possibilities. Adding in various versions of second-order and third-order reasonableness
review creates even more possible levels of review.
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However, practical reasonableness, a hallmark of the common law,57
suggests the Court should resist such a proliferation in possible tests where
there is no demonstrated need for such additional levels. For purposes of
the discussion here, it is useful to note it would be best for the Court to stick
with seven levels of review and not engage in any unnecessary and confusing
additional proliferation. Of course, this does not mean the Court should
not adopt a variation within a level of review if institutional needs so
counsel. For example, in Fiallo v. Bell,58 the Court noted the extra level of
deference, more than the usual substantial deference of rational review,
given to congressional regulations of immigration and naturalization, where
“Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens.”
In addition to their number, there is also a problem if the Court were to
adopt additional mixing and matching of levels of review in addition to the
seven levels discussed here. For example, as a theoretical matter, the Court
could adopt levels of scrutiny between traditional intermediate review and
traditional strict scrutiny in addition to the intermediate with bite and loose
strict scrutiny standards discussed earlier.59 The Court could require, as a
version of intermediate review with bite, the government to have a
compelling government interest to regulate, but only require a substantial
relationship between means and ends and require the action not
substantively burden more persons than necessary. Alternatively, as a
version of loose strict scrutiny, the Court could require compelling
government interests, a least restrictive alternative test, but require only a
substantial relationship, rather than a direct relationship, between means and
ends. Adoption of such tests, however, would only add uncertainty to the
law. Which version of intermediate review with bite is more rigorous—the
current Central Hudson test (which adds to basic intermediate review only the
strict scrutiny direct relationship requirement),60 or the version suggested
above (which adds to basic intermediate scrutiny only the strict scrutiny
compelling government interest test)? Which version of loose strict scrutiny
is more rigorous—Bush v. Vera (which only waters down the least restrictive

57. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law,
45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992). See also Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers
Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 38–49 (1981).
58. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 24.
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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alternative requirement of strict scrutiny),61 or the version suggested above
(which only waters down the direct relationship requirement of strict
scrutiny)?
Having only one kind of intermediate review with bite and one kind of
loose strict scrutiny, the “base plus six” model preserves a system where in
each succeeding level of scrutiny is clearly more rigorous than the preceding
level.62 Thus, each level of review represents a step-ladder increase in the
rigor of scrutiny over the previous level.63 In the absence of any showing
that more than seven levels of scrutiny are needed to promote flexibility in
decision making, the Court should stick with those seven levels and not
engage in any unnecessary and confusing additional proliferation in the
levels of review. Further, if seven levels are used, the seven levels currently
used most frequently provide the soundest foundation on which to base
existing doctrine.64
3.

Acknowledging the Seven Existing Levels of Scrutiny

In addition to these observations, it would help certainty and
predictability in the law if the Court explicitly acknowledged the existence
in current doctrine of the seven levels of scrutiny. Explicitly only
acknowledging the three basic levels—rational review, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny—is valid for Equal Protection Doctrine.65 In
other areas of the law, a range of these four other standards are used to
respond to the nuances of those individual situations.66 It promotes neither
61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
62. Each level is clearly more rigorous since basic intermediate review involves all three prongs
reflecting an intermediate standard of review; intermediate with bite adds one strict scrutiny inquiry
(direct relationship); loose strict scrutiny adds two strict scrutiny inquiries (direct relationship and
compelling government interests); strict scrutiny adopts a strict scrutiny inquiry for all three prongs of
the test. See R. Randall Kelso, United States Standards of Review Versus the International Standard of
Proportionality: Convergence and Symmetry, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 485 (2013).
63. The phrase “step-ladder” increase is used to underscore that each level of review is clearly
more rigorous than the preceding level. Such a structure is useful for principled decision making as it
permits the Court to raise or lower the standard of review depending on the factors used to determine
the extent to which heightened scrutiny is appropriate, those factors discussed infra text accompanying
notes 83–148.
64. See, e.g., Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 450–63 (1975)
(discussing origins of the common law and wisdom of building on existing precedent where possible).
65. See Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4) (explaining how the rational basis review applies to
the Equal Protection Clause).
66. See Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 12) (discussing second-order and third-order
reasonableness review); Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript at 32) (discussing intermediate review with
bite, in addition to standard intermediate review); Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 48) (discussing
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certainty nor predictability in the law to fail to acknowledge these standards
of review.
For cases involving considering legitimate government interests, this
means acknowledging the roles that second-order and third-order
reasonableness review play in constitutional analysis. The Court should
squarely face that in some cases a real choice exists between applying basic
rationality review or either second-order and third-order reasonableness
review, and should face that choice directly.67 For example, the Court has
applied strict scrutiny in cases involving significant burdens on the
fundamental right to marry, as in Zablocki v. Redhail.68 The Court has also
applied strict scrutiny to significant burdens on the right to travel in Shapiro
v. Thompson69 and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County.70 However, in cases
involving less than substantial burdens on these unenumerated fundamental
rights, the Court has applied some version of rational review, but seemingly
without the usual deference to the legislative branch typical of minimum
rationality review.71 Candid acknowledgment of this may also help explain
the higher than basic rationality review given in other cases of a less than
substantial burden on an unenumerated fundamental right.72
Explicit acknowledgment of the seven levels of scrutiny would also help
clarify various aspects of heightened scrutiny. For example, the Court has
loose strict scrutiny, in addition to standard strict scrutiny). As noted in supra note 31, the seven
standards are summarized in Appendix A to this Article. Appendix B to this Article summarizes in
which constitutional doctrines each of these seven standards are currently used.
67. One example of this issue being faced directly was in Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–21
(1993), where the Court clarified cases involving the mentally impaired trigger standard rationality
review, not any heightened rational review standard as suggested by City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985). On this suggestion in Cleburne, see Kelso, supra note 2, at Part III.B.2
nn.167–82.
68. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–88 (1978).
69. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–38 (1969).
70. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 253–60 (1974) (impinging on the right to
travel does not promote compelling state interest and thus fails strict scrutiny).
71. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987) (finding restrictions on prisoners’ ability to
marry are not reasonable); see also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1985) (holding Iowa may reasonably
decide to impose a residency requirement before individuals can obtain a divorce in the state).
72. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) (providing a
court must consider both “burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those
laws confer” (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899–901 (1992) (performing
this balancing with respect to parental notification provision))), discussed in Kelso, supra note 2,
at Part IV.A.2 nn.227–48; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444–49, 455 (1990) (explaining a
minor must wait forty eight hours after notifying one parent of intent to get abortion, and parental
notification requirement with judicial by-pass option, constitutional as they “reasonably further”
legitimate interests with “only a minimal burden” on minor).
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struggled with details on the appropriate standard of review to apply to
various kinds of free speech cases: cases involves government spending,73
regulations of commercial speech;74 cable television regulations;75 and
court injunctions on free speech rights.76 Acknowledgment of the seven
levels of scrutiny would also help explain the language in Bush v. Vera, which
rejected a traditional strict scrutiny approach77 while not undermining
traditional strict scrutiny in areas like affirmative action in employment
where the Court intends traditional strict scrutiny to apply.78
Some Justices have suggested getting rid of the “intermediate with bite”
and “loose strict scrutiny” test by rephrasing the commercial speech
doctrine, currently Central Hudson, and racial redistricting cases, currently
Bush v. Vera, as strict scrutiny cases.79 That would get the standards of
review to three basic tiers of review (rationality review, intermediate review,
and strict scrutiny) and two reasonableness tests (burden on challenger in
one; burden on the State in the other). On the other hand, there is some
benefit in having intermediate with bite and loose strict scrutiny, as they are
logically consistent steppingstones in the level of review between
intermediate review and strict scrutiny,80 and one can agree with the current
approach that because commercial speech is “heartier” it does not need
strict scrutiny protection81 and state governments should be given greater

73. These government spending cases include government speech cases, government
advertising campaigns, government grants or subsidies, or public-school education cases.
See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, and
“Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 311–23 (2016) (comparing public school cases,
government grant and subsidy cases, government speech cases, and governmental advertising cases).
74. Id. at 370–73.
75. Id. at 374–77.
76. Id. at 392–93.
77. See Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 48–50 nn.301–08).
78. Id. (manuscript at 30–33 nn.191–208).
79. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating the Central Hudson test should not be used, and thus regular content-based strict scrutiny
analysis would apply (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 523 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring))); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999–1003 (1996) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring) (reaffirming the principle that all racial classifications should be governed by strict scrutiny,
even for cases involving racial districting issues).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
81. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 & n.24
(1976) (stating “commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds” of speech).
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than strict scrutiny flexibility in making their political redistricting
decisions.82
III. DETERMINING PROPER LEVEL OF SCRUTINY: RATIONAL BASIS,
REASONABLENESS REVIEW, INTERMEDIATE REVIEW, OR STRICT SCRUTINY
A. Factors Used to Determine Level of Scrutiny
1.

Introduction

In deciding whether to adopt rationality review, reasonableness balancing,
intermediate review, or strict scrutiny in any particular case, the Court uses
a myriad of factors. The default position is rationality review. Under
rationality review, the Court presumes government action is constitutional
and defers to legislative or executive judgment as long as the government
decision is rational, i.e., not arbitrary or capricious.83 Discussing the
requirement of a rational relationship, the Court noted in 1992 in Nordlinger
v. Hahn:84
As a general rule, “legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality.” Accordingly, this Court’s cases are clear that, unless a
classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes
exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently
suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the
classification rationally further a legitimate state interest.

As discussed below, ten separate factors are identifiable as relevant in
determining whether a higher level of review should be applied. These
factors are organizable around four main considerations: (1) is there any
“text” in the Constitution, interpreted in light of context and history,
suggesting the framers and ratifiers of that provision expected some more
vigorous judicial review;85 (2) is there any evidence suggesting the normal

82. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 977 (“[S]tate actors should not be ‘trapped between the competing
hazards of liability’ by the imposition of unattainable requirements under the rubric of strict scrutiny.”
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
83. See supra text accompanying note 16 (discussing the elements of rationality review).
84. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (citations omitted) (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961)).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 89–93.
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legislative or executive “process” is likely not to be functioning in an
ordinary manner so the Court can feel comfortable deferring to the
government result;86 (3) is there any reason to suspect as a matter of
“substance” the government action is burdening individuals in an irrational
or unreasonable manner;87 and (4) is recognition of heightened scrutiny
consistent with the proper role of judicial review.88 These four
considerations—text, process, substance, and judicial role—form the basis
for the factors used in Court opinions.
2.

Discussion of Ten Factors Used

The first of these ten factors are: (1) whether arguments of text, context,
and history suggest the classification is one the framers and ratifiers would
have thought deserves heightened scrutiny. The Court has said, “The Court
is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution.”89 With regard to the text and
history of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court noted as long ago as 1886
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment “are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
to any differences of race, or color, or of nationality.”90 Because such cases
involve the core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause, cases involving race, ethnicity, or national origin routinely trigger the
highest kind of Equal Protection Clause review—strict scrutiny.91
The Court in footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., mentioned
three additional factors.92 They are: (2) whether a fundamental right is
involved, particularly a right that appears to be within the specific
prohibitions of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
86. See infra text accompanying notes 94–95, 103–106.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 96–99.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 100–02.
89. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
90. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
91. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 724–25 (“[I]t is firmly established that race and national
origin classifications must meet the most exacting standard of judicial review.”); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223–25, 235–37 (1995) (“Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching examination[.]” (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986))); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (“When they touch
upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden
he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”).
92. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discussing additional
factors to take into consideration when determining a statute’s constitutionality).
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amendments;93 (3) whether a deficiency exists in the “political process[]
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation”;94 and (4) whether the statute is “directed [against] particular
religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities[,]” or reflects “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities” who cannot be expected to protect
their interests adequately in the legislative process.95
Three more factors were mentioned in Frontiero v. Richardson.96 They are:
(5) whether the classification burdens an immutable characteristic, like race,
national origin, or gender;97 (6) whether the classification, even if not
immutable, burdens an individual for something not the product of that
individual’s choice, contrary to “the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility [or
wrongdoing]”;98 and (7) whether the judge views the classification as a
product of false stereotypes about individuals, particularly if based on
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of individuals, or part of a
historical pattern of discrimination.99
Two additional factors were discussed in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.100 They are: (8) the extent judges are competent to make
substantive decisions heightened scrutiny require, which involve
scrutinizing the legislative judgment as to whether the ends are sufficiently
important or compelling, the means are sufficiently narrowly tailored or
necessary, and whether any alternatives to the legislation would be effective
or not;101 and (9) would a Pandora’s box open where heightened scrutiny
in the case would require heightened scrutiny in other similarly situated
cases, creating increased litigation and more unpredictability in the law.102
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
97. Id. at 686.
98. Id. at 686–87 (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175).
99. Id. at 684–86. One corollary to this factor asks whether in more recent times the legislature
has shown a willingness to reject such outmoded stereotypes through “increase[ed] sensitivity” to such
classifications, id. at 686–87, or adopt ameliorative legislation. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 443–45 (1985) (concluding the court below erred “in holding mental
retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review . . . .”).
100. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
101. Id. at 442–43.
102. Id. at 445–46. Rationality review discourages litigation given its strong presumption of
constitutionality but allows findings of unconstitutionality if the legislation does not advance
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An additional concern (10) exists with specialized matters on government
action not being the product of normal legislative enactment. For example,
there is a suspicion of state legislative motives in cases involving
Dormant Commerce Clause review because state legislatures, whom only
in-state citizens elect, may have a political predisposition for advancing local
state parochial interests to the detriment of the national interest.103
Similarly, there is a concern with unbiased, normal legislative processes in
Contract Clause cases involved with regulating only a narrow range of
contractors or the government limiting the rights under its own
contracts,104 or the government singling out an individual for specialized
regulatory treatment under the Takings Clause,105 or Congress possibly
intruding into the Court’s power of judicial review under Congress
enforcement powers of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.106
B. Analyzing the Factors Used
1.

Nordlinger Analysis

In terms of the two categories under Nordlinger v. Hahn that trigger
heightened scrutiny, fundamental rights and suspect classifications,107

“legitimate state interests” such as “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” or is not
rationally related to advancing legitimate interests by being “arbitrary or irrational.” Id. at 446–47
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). For cases of findings of
unconstitutionality under minimum rationality review, see Kelso, supra note 2, at Part III.A.1
nn.124–200 & Part III.A.2 nn.201–14.
103. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945) (“[T]he Court has often
recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is
unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests
within the state are affected.”).
104. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242–44, 248–50 (1978) (regulating
a narrow range of contract actors by applying retroactive contract law only to business with more than
100 employees when employer closes in-state office or terminates pension plan); see also U.S. Tr. Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22–24, 30–31 (1977) (limiting contract rights retroactively under its own state
bonds triggers a different, and higher, standard of review than normal deference to the legislature).
105. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385–86, 388–91 (1994) (addressing individual
singled out for individualized treatment under Takings Clause).
106. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (noting for Congress to invoke
§ 5, its remedy must be “congruent” and “proportionate” to conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2018), as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs,
574 S. Ct. 352, 357–58 (2015).
107. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (asking whether a classification warrants “some
form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the
basis of an inherently suspect characteristic . . . .”); see also supra text accompanying note 84.
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factor (1) on the framers and ratifiers’ intent applies in both cases of
fundamental rights and suspect or quasi-suspect classifications.108 Factor
(2) focuses directly on the question of whether a fundamental right
exists.109 Since all Bill of Rights are fundamental, with the exception of the
Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement and Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial cases,110 all other Bill of Rights cases should, and do, involve
something more than basic rationality review.111
In contrast, factors (3)—(7) focus primarily on whether a suspect class
(triggering strict scrutiny) or quasi-suspect class (triggering intermediate
review) is involved.112 Factors (8) and (9) on judicial competence to
scrutinize legislative judgment and concerns of a Pandora’s box also
predominantly apply in cases of suspect or quasi-suspect classifications.113
Given its focus on fundamental rights and suspect classes, Nordlinger does
not address factor (10) and its concern with specialized matters on
government action not being the product of normal legislative activity but
more of a self-interested capacity.114
2.

Text, Process, Substance, Judicial Role

A second way to organize the ten factors used to determine the proper
level of scrutiny involves separating the factors into the considerations of
108. For a discussion of factor (1), see infra text accompanying notes 149–52 (proving an equal
protection analysis); notes 219–20 (explaining fundamental rights due process analysis).
109. See supra text accompanying note 93 (discussing the “fundamental rights” aspect of Carolene
Products addressed in footnote 4).
110. See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 27, at 643–44 (“As a matter of deference to state
procedural practices, probably the only two aspects of the Bill of Rights that are not ‘fundamental’
today are the Fifth Amendment . . . and the Seventh Amendment . . . .”).
111. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 & n.27 (2008) (noting rational basis
should not be used “to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated
right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the
right to keep and bear arms” because, if so, the enumerated right protection “would be redundant with
the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect”).
112. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 147–220, factors (3)–(7) tend to frame the
levels of review used in Equal Protection Clause doctrine.
113. For a discussion of factors (8) and (9), see infra text accompanying notes 194–95, 201–202,
213 (providing equal protection analysis). The concern with judicial competence can also apply in
fundamental rights cases and specialized cases of concern with government action, such as Court
review of whether a burden on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” under the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, as discussed at KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 880–801. The concern
with a Pandora’s box can occur in deciding on whether an additional unenumerated fundamental right
exists, as referenced infra text accompanying notes 225–36.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 103–06 (concerning self-interest rather than legislative
activity).
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text, process, substance, and judicial role. As noted above, factors (1) and
(2) focus on aspects of text, context, and history to determine areas where
the Constitution’s “text and design” invite more vigorous judicial review
than minimum rationality.115 In contrast, factors (3) and (4) focus on
legislative process concerns, as does factor (10) on aspects of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, Takings Clause and Contract Clause
doctrine.116 Substantive concerns are included in factors (5)–(7).117
Judicial role considerations are involved with factors (8)–(9).118
3.

Whether the Factor Tends to Support Heightened Scrutiny or Not

Another way to classify the ten factors is whether the factor tends to
support heightened scrutiny or tends to limit review to minimum rationality
review. Factor (1) tends to limit heightened scrutiny to those clearly
expected from text or design.119 Factor (2) is also limiting if restricted to
enumerated fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights.120 Factor (8) on
judicial competence to second-guess legislative choices,121 and factor (9),
on concern with a Pandora’s box122 also tend to limit areas where
heightened scrutiny may be appropriate.

115. See supra text accompanying notes 89–93 (mentioning the rationale for analysis under strict
scrutiny).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95, 103–106 (linking Factors 3 and 4 with legislative
process concerns).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 96–99 (offering immutable characteristics as an
example).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 100–02 (considering impacts of the judge’s decisionmaking role).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 89–91 (suggesting heightened review for the core
purpose of text, such as race, ethnic, or national origin discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 110–11 (discussing how virtually all the Bill of Rights
are viewed as fundamental, except for the Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement and
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial).
121. See supra text accompanying note 103 (analyzing concerns about judicial competence to
second-guess suggests deference to the legislature, as under rationality review).
122. See supra text accompanying note 104 (evaluating concerns about opening a Pandora’s box
of heightened scrutiny cases suggests limiting review to rationality review).
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In contrast, the process factors (3) and (4)123 and factor (10)124 tend to
expand the number of areas where heightened scrutiny might be appropriate
by exploring where the outcome of the normal legislative process is
generally untrustworthy. So, too, the substantive factors of (5), (6), and (7)
raise concerns about the results of legislative action.125 Factor (2) can also
be used to expand heightened scrutiny if extended to unenumerated
fundamental rights, as the Court has done in many areas.126
4.

Theories of Judicial Review

Another way to categorize the ten factors involves consideration of four
main styles of judicial decision making. In general, “there are two main
questions that lie behind any act of judicial interpretation”: (1) the nature of
law and (2) “the nature of the judicial task.”127 Concerning the nature of
law, there are two approaches. “Under one approach, law is seen primarily
as a set of rules and principles whose application is guided by an analytic
methodology of logic and reason[:]” the analytic, or conceptualist,
approach.128 “Alternatively, law can be seen as ultimately to be judged not
in terms of logical consistency, but as a means to some social end through a
pragmatic or functional treatment of rules[:]” the functional, or pragmatic,
approach.129 “Concerning. . . the nature of the judicial task,” one approach
views law as “solely . . . a body of rules and principles from which legal
conclusions are derived[:]” the positivist assumption.130 “In contrast, a judge
could aim at producing law and applications of law that accord with certain
moral principles embedded in society’s legal and moral culture[;]” a normative

123. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97 (determining deficiencies in the political process
or legislation against discrete and insular minorities not likely to be able to protect their interests in the
political process suggests greater judicial scrutiny of the legislative process is appropriate).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 105–08 (interpreting additional concerns about the
result not being the product of normal legislative action suggests heightened judicial review is
appropriate).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 99–101 (reviewing harms based on status matters like
race, ethnicity, national origin or gender, or harm based on something not the product of individual
choice, or harm in the context of a pattern of false stereotypes suggest the legislative outcome cannot
be normally trusted and heightened judicial review is proper).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 225–43 (discussing Court development of unenumerated
fundamental rights).
127. KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 19.
128. Id. at 20.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 25.
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assumption.131 Based on these observations, four main judicial decisionmaking styles exist: Formalism (analytic positivism), Holmesian (functional
positivism), Instrumentalism (functional normative), and Natural Law
(analytic normative).132
No matter what their favored judicial decision-making style, not
surprisingly, all justices begin with factor (1) concerning whether arguments
of text, context, and history suggest the classification is one the framers and
ratifiers would have thought deserves heightened scrutiny.133
Predispositions to use the remaining factors vary depending on the judge’s
judicial decision-making style.
Two of the ten factors reflect an emphasis on clear and predictable rules,
a focus of formalist judges.134 These two factors are: (2) whether a
fundamental right is involved, particularly a right appearing within the
specific prohibitions of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments;135 and (9) would a Pandora’s box open where heightened
scrutiny in the case would lead to demands for heightened scrutiny in other
similarly situated cases, creating more litigation and unpredictability in the
law.136

131. Id.
132. Id. at 31. For detailed discussion of each of the styles of judicial decision making, both
generally and in the context of constitutional interpretation, see id. at 35, 295, 319, 342, 354 (referencing
formalism, Holmesian, instrumentalism, and Natural Law principles). See R. Randall Kelso, Contra
Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch: Originalists Should Adopt a Living Constitution, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 112,
119–29 (2017) (summarizing the four judicial decision-making styles).
133. On factor (1), see supra text accompanying notes 89–91.
134. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26 at 39–40 (discussing the formalist emphasis on clear
and predicable rules).
135. Factor (2) supports higher than basic rationality review for Bill of Rights provisions.
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibitions of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments[.]”); see
also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 & n.27 (2008) (noting rational basis should not
be used “to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it
the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep
and bear arms” because, if so, the enumerated right protection “would be redundant with the separate
constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect”). Formalist judges can also
support heightened scrutiny for unenumerated fundamental rights that are part of our nation’s history
and tradition. See infra text accompanying note 233, citing, inter alia, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race. . . . [S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential[.]”).
136. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985) (“[I]f
the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect . . . it would be
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Two other factors relate to the preference to defer to legislative and
executive decision making, where possible. Holmesian jurists are
predisposed to adopt these factors.137 These factors ask: (3) whether a
deficiency exists in the “political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”;138 and (4) whether the
statute is “directed at particular religious . . . national . . . or racial
minorities,” or reflects “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”
who, because they are discrete and insular, cannot be expected to protect
their interests adequately in the legislative process.139 Where such a
concern exists with the political process, judges are not prepared to exercise
basic rational review deference. This concern with the nature of the
legislative process also appears in cases involving factor (10) on
Dormant Commerce Clause, Takings Clause, or Contract Clause review
where concerns with the legislative process, particularly self-interested
regulation, suggests higher review.140
Two other factors reflect the concern that individuals should be held
responsible for their own actions but should not be punished for things over
which they have no control. These factors reflect a Natural Law committed
to reason, which includes a background moral principle that burdens should
bear some connection to individual responsibility.141 These two factors are:
(5) whether the classification burdens an immutable characteristic, like race
or gender;142 and (6) whether the classification, whether immutable or not,
burdens an individual for something not the product of the individual’s

difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups . . . . One need mention in
this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.”).
137. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 43–45 (highlighting the Holmesian emphasis on
deference to legislative and executive decision making).
138. See, e.g., Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
139. Id.
140. On factor (10), see supra text accompanying notes 103–06.
141. For a discussion of natural law commitment to reason and reasoned decision making, see
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at § 3.4 nn.78–94. For a discussion of natural rights and burdens on
individual liberty needing justification, such as preventing one individual from “violating the rights of
another,” see Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication,
12 CONST. COMMENT. 93, 113–20 (1995). See also Jonathan Crowe, Explaining Natural Rights: Ontological
Freedom and the Foundations of Political Discourse, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 70, 85 (2009) (discussing
“natural rights” in the context of “the ethical personality of mature humans is dominated by their
capacity for moral self-expression by means of responsible choice”).
142. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[S]ex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth . . . .”).
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choice, like status as an illegitimate child or being the child of parents who
are illegally in the United States.143
Two final factors reflect focus on more carefully scrutinizing burdens the
judge feels are the product of wrong-headed thinking and on achieving
sound social policy. These factors resonate with Instrumentalist judges.144
These factors are: (7) whether the judges views the classification as a product
of false stereotypes about individuals, particularly if based on outmoded
notions of the relative capabilities of men and women or part of an historical
pattern of such discrimination;145 and (8) to what extent the judges are
competent to make the substantive decisions required at heightened
scrutiny, which involves scrutinizing legislative judgment as to whether the
ends are sufficiently important or compelling, the means are sufficiently
narrowly tailored or necessary, and whether any alternatives to the
legislation would be effective.146 Unsurprisingly, Instrumentalist judges,
with their greater willingness to consider social policy in decision making,
are often more willing to conclude they are competent to make the kind of
substantive decisions necessary at heightened scrutiny.147 Formalist,
Holmesian, and Natural Law judges are less confident about this matter,

143. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (“[I]mposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .”).
144. For a discussion of Instrumentalist concern with sound social policy, see KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 26, at 47–50 nn.51–61, 52–53 nn.69–77.
145. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684–85 (“There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. . . . . [O]ur statute books gradually became laden
with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes.”); id. at 686–87 (“[W]hat differentiates sex from
such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously
relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
its individual members.”).
146. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985)
(“Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we
doubt that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the classification deals with mental
retardation.”).
147. See id. at 472 (Marshall, J., concurring in part dissenting in part) (“Heightened scrutiny does
not allow courts to second-guess reasoned legislative or professional judgments tailored to the unique
needs of a group like the retarded, but it does seek to assure that the hostility or thoughtlessness with
which there is reason to be concerned has not carried the day.”). For a categorization of recent justices
on the Supreme Court as Instrumentalists, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 325, 422, 423 (listing
former Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Fortas, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Ginsburg; current Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan).
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particularly Holmesian judges with their preference for deference to
legislative/executive action.148
IV. ANALYZING EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS, FREE SPEECH,
AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
A. Factors Under Equal Protection
Currently the Court uses rationality review not only for standard social or
economic regulation,149 but also for laws involving wealth, age, physical or
mental disabilities, sexual orientation, or state discrimination against
unlawful aliens or aliens in “political function” jobs.150 Cases involving
gender discrimination, discriminating against illegitimate children, or
discrimination against the children of illegal aliens trigger intermediate
review.151 Cases involving race, ethnic, or national origin discrimination,
religious discrimination, or state discrimination against lawfully resident
aliens trigger strict scrutiny.152
1.

Race, Ethnicity & National Origin Discrimination

The history surrounding adoption of the Equal Protection Clause
indicates one clear purpose of the clause was to outlaw the “Black Codes”
that had proliferated in many Southern states during the post-Civil War
period after the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery.153 The Black
Codes imposed severe legal restrictions on newly freed African-Americans.
148. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442–43, 446–47 (majority opinion) (remaining justices on
the Court unwilling to apply heightened scrutiny in Cleburne). For categorization of recent justices on
the Supreme Court as Holmesian, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at §§ 10.1, 13.4, Table 13.4
(listing former Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stewart, Harlan, and White; current
Chief Justice Roberts); id. at §§ 9.1, 13.4, Table 13.4 (listing former Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Black and Scalia; current Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett as
Formalist judges)); id. at §§ 12.1, 13.4, Table 13.4 (former Justices Powell, O’Connor, Kennedy and
Souter as Natural Law judges).
149. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 1182–84.
150. See id. at 1186 (wealth); id. at 1189 (age); id. at 1190 (physical or mental disabilities); id.
at 1192 (sexual orientation); 1155–1158 (“political functions” exception).
151. See generally id. at 1165–1169 nn.363–76 (gender); id. at 1178 (illegitimacy); id. at 1158–1160
(children of illegal aliens).
152. See generally id. at 1105 (race, ethnic, or national origin); id. at 1161 (religious); id. at 1156
nn.316–24 (lawfully resident aliens).
153. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons
from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 187, 241–46 (2005) (discussing Congress
making illegal the violation of Civil Rights of other citizens under color of law or custom).
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The Codes typically prohibited blacks from voting or holding office, serving
on juries, or marrying whites. The Codes gave employers “contract rights
and methods of enforcing contracts against black laborers that were not
available in contracts with white laborers. Further, the [Codes] gave
landowners methods of disciplining black tenants and field hands that they
were not legally authorized to use against white tenants and field hands.”154
The Black Codes authorized “employers and landowners, as well as ordinary
whites organized into patrols, to enforce an informal, customary system of
controls that restricted blacks’ freedom to move from place to place”
through discriminatory application of vagrancy laws.155 In addition,
“blacks in the South were denied access to local systems of civil and criminal
justice when they sought to redress violations of their rights and crimes
committed against them.”156
In response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
declared all persons born in the United States were “citizens of the United
States” and listed their rights, including the right to own property, the right
to enter contracts without racial discrimination, and the right to safety
from corrupt law enforcement practices.
One purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to make it clear the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was constitutional.157 Given this history, the Court has always held a bare
desire to discriminate on racial grounds constitutes an illegitimate
governmental interest, as in the 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.158
In addition, cases of racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination
involve several factors supporting heightened scrutiny. Historically, racial,
ethnic, or national origin minorities are (4) discrete and insular minorities
unlikely able to protect themselves adequately in the political process.159
154. Id. at 242.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 958 n.22 (2002), citing,
inter alia, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67–71 (1872); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme
Court, 1999 Term–Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 64 (2000); Michael W.
McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of
the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1281 (1997) (“The clearest and most indisputable purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide constitutional authority for the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which outlawed the Black Codes.”).
158. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).
159. See United States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
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Race, ethnic, or national origin are (5) immutable characteristics,160 and
(6) not the product of the person’s choice.161 There is also (7) extensive
history of race, ethnic, or national origin discrimination based upon false
stereotypes.162 For all of these reasons, use of strict scrutiny review for
discrimination against racial, ethnic, or national origin minorities has been
relatively uncontroversial.163 In cases of racial or ethnic affirmative action
disadvantaging whites, there is not the same (4) discrete and insular minority
argument or (7) history of discrimination against whites, and thus whether
to apply strict scrutiny or some lesser form of scrutiny has been the subject
of debate.164
2.

Alienage Discrimination

In 1971, in Graham v. Richardson,165 the Court held with respect to persons
in the United States alienage is a “suspect classification.” The Court noted,
“Aliens as a class are a prime example of [4] a ‘discrete and insular’ minority
for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”166 Alienage,
while not immutable, is (6) not the product of an individual’s choice.167
State laws restricting the eligibility of lawfully resident aliens for welfare
160. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[R]ace and national origin [are]
immutable characteristic[s] determined solely by the accident of birth . . . .”).
161. Id. (stating such discrimination “would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .’”).
162. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law
in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2072–113 (2002) (discussing such history and legal
attempts to counteract). See also id. at 2113–59 (describing the history of gender discrimination and legal
challenges); id. at 2159–92 (discussing history of sexual orientation discrimination and legal challenges).
163. See generally Kelso, supra note 5 (manuscript at 22–25 nn.151–60).
164. See generally id. (manuscript at 25–26 nn.161–66), citing, inter alia, Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 564–72 (1990) (providing the 5–4 decision of Instrumentalist Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and deference-to-government Holmesian Justice White adopting intermediate
review for federal government race-based affirmative action program); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222–35 (1996) (providing the 5–4 decision adopting strict scrutiny in all race-based
affirmative action programs, even federal, overruling Metro Broadcasting, with Instrumentalist
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg in dissent). Note the (1) text and core purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment and arguments about (5) immutable characteristics and (6) not being
burdened for something not the product of choice support strict scrutiny for all race-based
classifications, even affirmative action, consistent with Formalist and Natural Law justices so holding
in the Metro Broadcasting dissent and Adarand majority opinion.
165. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
166. Id. at 372 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152–153 & n.4 (1938)).
167. Id. (“[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect . . . .”).
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benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with national policies
permitting residency in an area entrusted to the Federal Government, and
thus (10) are not part of the normal legislative process.168
On the other hand, under the political function exception, if state
employment positions involve functions going to the heart of representative
government then barriers against even legal resident aliens are given only
rationality review. The reason is there is no similar (10) concern with
legislative process where states are merely establishing their own form of
government, and thus limiting the right to govern and exercise discretionary
state power over others to persons who are full-fledged members of the
political community.169
Aliens who are illegally in the United States have been held entitled to
protection under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, as they are
“persons” textually entitled to such protection, but such state regulations
are typically subjected only to rationality review.170 They have not been
characterized as a suspect class because entry into the class is the result of
(6) a voluntary criminal act, something for which individuals are
responsible,171 and the presence in the United States (10) is not approved
by the national government and thus such state laws do not conflict with
national policies.172
168. Id. at 377–78 (“Congress has not seen fit to impose any burden on restriction on aliens
who become indigent after their entry into the United States. . . . State laws that restrict the eligibility
of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with these overriding national
policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”).
169. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220–22 (1984); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432,
454 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72–76 (1979) (using rationality review in all three cases
for jobs part of representative democracy under “political functions” exception to strict scrutiny).
170. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84–86 (1976).
171. Thus, factor (6) does not apply in this kind of case. See supra text accompanying notes 98,
167.
172. Thus, factor (10) does not apply in this kind of case. See supra text accompanying note 168.
Of course, there still might be in any individual case an argument for federal preemption of the state
law as a statutory matter independent of constitutional review. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492, 2501–07 (2012) (holding 5–3 that federal immigration law preempted Arizona from enacting
provisions making the failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state
misdemeanor, making it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona,
and a provision authorizing state arrests for any individual if the officer has probable cause to believe
the individual has committed some other offense that would make the individual removable from the
United States); Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1972–73 (2011) (emphasis
added) (reasoning an Arizona’s requirement that every employer verify the employment eligibility of
hired employees through a specific Internet-based was not preempted because the system fell within a
“savings clause” in federal immigration law, which preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or
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In Plyler v. Doe,173 a case involving the rights of the children of illegal
immigrants to attend public school, a 5–4 Court applied the intermediate
scrutiny requirement of a substantial government interest, not rational
review legitimate interest, to find Texas could not deny free public education
to the children of illegal immigrants. The Court noted (6) children are not
responsible for being in the country illegally, as that is a choice of the
parents, and (8) not educating children within the state seemed to some
justice’s poor policy.174
Similarly, in Lewis v. Thompson,175 the Second Circuit considered part of
the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 that denied for the first year after birth
automatic eligibility to Medicaid benefits for citizen children of illegal alien
mothers different than the automatic eligibility extended to the citizen
children of citizen mothers. The plaintiffs contended the intermediate
scrutiny applied in Plyler was appropriate because the discriminatory denial
of automatic eligibility was imposed on the citizen children solely because
of the unqualified alien status of their mothers.176 The Court agreed,
noting, “the Plaintiffs’ claim is stronger [than in Plyler] in that here it is
asserted on behalf of citizen children, whereas the claimants in Plyler were
alien children.”177 Perhaps more simply, intermediate scrutiny was
appropriate in Lewis because, as stated in Plyler, “imposing disabilities on the
. . . child [in these circumstances] is contrary to the basic concept of our
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing or similar laws) upon those who employ . . . unauthorized
aliens”).
173. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). The four-Justice dissent would have applied
minimum rationality review in the case. Id. at 242–43 (Burger, C.J., joined by White, Rehnquist &
O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).
174. Id. at 220 (“[I]mposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”
(quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))); Plyer, 457 U.S. at 221
(“[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives
to the benefit of us all. . . . We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.”).
The Court also analogized this case to cases involving illegitimate children, burdens on them also not
the product of individual choice, and for whom intermediate review has been applied since 1977. See
infra text accompanying notes 189–92. The majority in Plyler was composed of Instrumentalist
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, along with Natural Law Justice Powell.
Justice O’Connor was in dissent in Plyler, but early in her tenure on the Court she was more of a
Holmesian deference-to-government justice who later evolved into a Natural Law Justice. See generally
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 395–397 nn.173–85.
175. Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 590–92 (2d Cir. 2001).
176. Id. at 591.
177. Id.
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system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing.”178
Federal action with respect to aliens—whether by Congress, the
President, or administrative agencies pursuant to validly delegated power—
is tested using rational review.179 Congress is primarily responsible for
regulating the relations between the United States and aliens,180 and so
there is no concern here with (10) the legislative process overriding national
policies. Further, the fact such regulations may implicate foreign relations
also supports a deferential standard of review for Congressional or
Presidential made decisions concerning regulation of aliens.181 As the
Court noted in 1976 in Mathews v. Diaz,182 “[i]n the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”
3.

Gender Discrimination

In arguing for heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination, a 4-Justice
plurality noted in Frontiero v. Richardson,183
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an [5] immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to
violate [6] “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .”

In addition, the plurality noted, “[t]here can be no doubt that our Nation
has had [7] a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”184 An
178. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175); see also Lewis, 252 F.3d at 591
(discussing penalizing children for the illegal conduct of their parents).
179. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77–84 (1976).
180. Id. at 77–80.
181. See generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 853–63 (1987).
182. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 79–80.
183. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined
by Douglas, White & Marshall, JJ.) (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175).
184. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684. The plurality added:
Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of “romantic paternalism”
which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage. . . . As a result of notions
such as these, our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in
our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave
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additional argument the plurality opinion made supporting the conclusion
of (7) a history of discrimination based upon sexual stereotyping is that
“Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of
Government is not without significance to the question presently under
consideration.”185
Conversely, concern with gender discrimination was not (1) a core
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was for race.186 Further,
gender discrimination lacks the (4) discrete and insular minority argument
with respect to women, as there is with respect to race, ethnicity, or national
origin, as women comprise slightly more than 50% of the electorate.187 The
lack of support for heightened scrutiny from these factors supports the
Court’s eventual use of intermediate review for gender classification, as
opposed to strict scrutiny for race, ethnicity, national origin, or, as the

codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own
names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property
or to serve as legal guardians of their own children. And although blacks were guaranteed the
right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right—which is itself “preservative of other
basic civil and political rights”—until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.
Id. at 684–85 (internal citations omitted).
The plurality also noted such discrimination was often based on false stereotypes, stating,
“[S]tatutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire
class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members.” Id. at 686–87.
185. Id. at 687–88 (citations omitted). On this point, the plurality noted:
In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Congress expressly declared that no
employer, labor union, or other organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall
discriminate against any individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Similarly, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that no employer covered by the Act “shall
discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex.” And [Section] 1 of the Equal Rights
Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the legislatures of the
States for ratification, declares that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 89–91, 153–58 (emphasizing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose to address racial discrimination).
187. Cf. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1997) (questioning
whether it makes sense “to apply ‘political structure’ equal protection principles” if burdened group is
“a majority of the electorate”).
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plurality opinion in Frontiero suggests, for gender discrimination.188
4.

Illegitimacy Discrimination

In Trimble v. Gordon,189 the Court used the phrase “carefully tuned” and
“carefully tailored,” which are similar to the “closely related” or substantially
related language of intermediate scrutiny, to hold classifications based on
illegitimacy are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not so
related to “permissible state interests.” Critical to applying this standard of
review was the observation that illegitimate children (6) are not responsible
for their status.190 Further, there has been [7] a history of discrimination
against illegitimate children.191 Also, (4) illegitimate children are not likely
to be adequately protected in the political process.192
5.

Age Discrimination

The Court has consistently rejected heightened scrutiny for cases
involving the elderly or children.193 Support for this conclusion is draw
from the fact neither the elderly nor children were (1) among the original
focus of the framers and ratifiers to protect;194 the elderly are not (4) a
discrete and insular minority groups without either direct ability to vote or
participate in the political process,195 or, for children, parents, including
188. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying intermediate
review); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 (applying strict scrutiny for gender discrimination and race
discrimination).
189. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 & n.14 (1977).
190. See id. at 769–70 (1977) (noting “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))).
191. Id. at 769 (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.”).
192. Children, of course, have no right to vote on their own. While children are often viewed
as adequately protected because of many special interest groups concerned with rights of children
generally, see infra text accompanying note 194, since there are fewer number of illegitimate children,
special interest groups are less likely to adequately protect their interests in the political process.
193. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–14 (1976) (holding elderly
discrimination is not subject to strict scrutiny).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 144–46 (outlining discriminatory legislative action).
195. The elderly are the most reliable voting bloc and legislatures are quite responsive to their
concerns. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (stating unlike other suspect classes, like racial minorities, the
elderly are not “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))).
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legislators who are parents, who will protect their interests as surrogates.196
There does not exist (7) a strong or sustained pattern of discrimination
based upon false stereotypes not truly indicative of their abilities;197 and
there are concerns about (8) scrutinizing legislative judgment, particularly
regarding children, because as the Court often notes states have “greater
latitude to regulate the conduct of children[,]” in part because the law has
regarded “minors as having a lesser capability for making important
decisions.”198 There is also concern with (9) opening a Pandora’s box.199
These arguments all outweigh any argument of (6) heightened scrutiny
based on the status not being the product of individual choice.200

196. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472–73 n.24 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Statutes discriminating against the young have not been
common nor need be feared because those who do vote and legislate were once themselves young,
typically have children of their own, and certainly interact regularly with minors. Their social
integration means that minors, unlike discrete and insular minorities, tend to be treated in legislative
arenas with full concern and respect, despite their formal and complete exclusion from the electoral
process.”); Stuart N. Hart & Laura Thetaz-Bergman, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in
Implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 6 TRANS. L. & CONT. PROBS. 373, 379–90 (1997)
(discussing a range of children’s advocacy groups both in the United States and around the world). But
see Hiroharu Saito, Equal Protection for Children: Toward the Childist Legal Studies, 50 N. MEX. L. REV. 235,
252–53 (2020) (discussing children as politically powerless because of their inability to vote and age
requirements to hold office).
197. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (“While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on
the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’
or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative
of their abilities.”). Most statutes involving children or the aged are uncontroversial as based on
understandable concerns. But see Saito, supra note 196, at 254–55 (discussing “exaggerated negative
stereotype of children”).
198. Carey v. Population Servs., Inc., 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) (plurality opinion) (citing
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170–71 (1944)); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637–43
(1968). But see Saito, supra note 196, at 255–66 (arguing society tends to underestimate children’s ability
to make decisions, while overestimating the decision-making ability of adults).
199. See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445–46 (noting a Pandora’s box problem with “the
aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm”).
200. Naturally, no one chooses to be a child or elderly; it is simply biology. Cf. Saito, supra
note 196, at 268 (noting while both may seem equally immutable in this sense, since the majority of
adults know they will one day become elderly, but they have outgrown their childhood, they are more
likely “to empathize” with conditions for the elderly to “avoid imposing any future disadvantages on
themselves.” Thus, the argument for childhood being a suspect class is stronger than the elderly on
this factor).
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Cases involving physical or mental disability also trigger rationality
review.201 As the Court noted in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,202
mental retardation is (6) not the product of the individual’s choice, and
sometimes is (5) an immutable characteristic. Many factors support
applying minimum rationality review to classifications disadvantaging the
mentally retarded, including: (4) such groups are not politically powerless—
as demonstrated by effective lobbying groups on their behalf;203 the (7) lack
of recent history of legislative discrimination against the disabled;204 (8) a
concern with the ability of courts to scrutinize legislative decisions regarding
the disabled, a “difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for
legislators guided by qualified professionals”;205 and a concern with
(9) opening up a Pandora’s box where the elderly, the infirm, and individuals
at various levels of mental or physical disability206 would all claim grounds
for heightened scrutiny.
7.

Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Classifications involving sexual orientation currently trigger rationality
review under the United States Constitution.207 This is true despite possible
arguments regarding the fact sexual orientation appears not to be a lifestyle
preference, but (5) a substantially immutable characteristic genetics and
hormonal influences predominantly determine, and (6) not the product of
individual choice,208 and (7) there is a history of discriminatory legislation

201. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442–47.
202. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442–47.
203. Id. at 445.
204. Id. at 443–45.
205. Id. at 442–43.
206. Id. at 445–46. Because some factors support heightened scrutiny, some Instrumentalist
Justices, or Natural Law Justices with Instrumentalist leanings, like Justice Souter, see KELSO &
KELSO, supra note 26, at 400–02 nn.198–209, have suggested something higher than minimum
rationality review should be used in cases of the mentally impaired. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 335–37
(Souter, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Because this
court has not recognized sexual orientation as a suspect classification, [plaintiff’s] claim is governed by
rational basis review.” (citing Scarborough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir.
2006))).
208. See generally Jeffrey A. Kershaw, Toward an Establishment Theory of Gay Personhood, 58 VAND L.
REV. 555, 580–93 (2005) (discussing and analyzing research concerning explanations of
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based upon false stereotypes.209
Under state constitutions, some state supreme courts have ruled sexual
orientation discrimination is a suspect class, triggering heightened
scrutiny.210 Another possible argument, as a practical matter, is
discrimination based upon sexual orientation draws distinctions based upon
sex, and thus should trigger intermediate review as a form of gender
discrimination.211 Despite such arguments, the Supreme Court, and thus
lower federal courts, subject cases of sexual orientation discrimination under
the United States Constitution only to rationality review.212
8.

Wealth Discrimination

Wealth discrimination ordinarily triggers rationality review.213 Support
for this conclusion comes after noting wealth classifications: (1) were not

homosexuality); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 937–46 (1989).
209. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314–20 (D. Conn. 2012)
(discussing the history of discriminatory legislation against gays and lesbians (in today’s terminology
LGBTQ+ individuals), while noting the discrimination “bears no relation whatsoever to an individual’s
ability to perform[.]” (citing Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
437 (S.D. Ohio 1994))).
210. See In re Marriage Cases [six consolidated appeals], 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (applying strict
scrutiny to sexual orientation cases); Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 445–48 (Or. Ct.
App. 1998); State v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 499–502 (Ky. 1992). This view has also appeared in
some dissenting state supreme court opinions. Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006)
(Fairhurst, J., dissenting); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
211. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (holding
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to intermediate scrutiny); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63–67 (Haw. 1993). Cf. Bostock v. Clayton
Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1756–57 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (providing discrimination based on sexual
orientation or transgender status qualifies as sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act).
212. See generally Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.
1995); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.
1989); Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984). In
1988, a Ninth Circuit panel did apply strict scrutiny to the Army’s policy of discrimination related to
sexual orientation in Watkins v. United States, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), but on en banc review the
case was resolved on grounds of equitable estoppel preventing the government from failing to reenlist
the individual in the case. Watkins v. United States, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). Since Watkins, the
Ninth Circuit has applied minimum rationality review in these cases. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def.
Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
213. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that
poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.” (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971))).
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, at 819–21.
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the original focus of the framers and ratifiers to protect;214 the poor do not
have a strong (4) discrete and insular minority group argument without the
ability to vote and protect their interests in the political process;215 there
does not exist (7) a strong or sustained pattern of discrimination based upon
false stereotypes not truly indicative of their abilities;216 and real concerns
about (8) second-guessing legislative judgment and (9) opening a Pandora’s
box in these kind of cases.217 These reasons can be viewed to outweigh
any argument of heightened scrutiny based on the condition of being poor
(6) often not being the product of individual choice.218
Despite this doctrine, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to substantial
burdens on the poor in the context of exercise of a fundamental right.219
For example, poll taxes that substantially burden the poor from exercising
their fundamental right to vote trigger strict scrutiny;220 filing fees or fees
for record preparation to permit an appeal trigger strict scrutiny if a

214. See supra text accompanying notes 153–58.
215. While there are barriers to full participation by the poor in the political process, depending
upon exactly how “the poor” are defined, they are a larger pool of voters than historically black,
Hispanic, or other racial or religious minority groups. But see Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring
Political Power: Suspect-Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CAL. L. REV. 323, 343–4 (2016) (“[P]oor’s
lack of descriptive representation contributes to the poor’s lack of substantive representation[]” and as
a “measure of political power, the Court should deem the poor a suspect class.”).
216. Most laws impacting the poor are based on accurate understandings of their impact on the
poor. Parties disagree about whether tax policy is too favorable to the rich or not, but that is part of
political debate, not any background assumption. But see Ross & Li, supra note 215, at 344 (reasoning
the poor “have suffered a well-chronicled history of discrimination. This history includes prejudicial
and exclusionary laws, social stigmatization of the poor, and broader social indifference about the needs
of the poor.”).
217. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (citations omitted)
(“The Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the
difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential
recipients.”). Most laws impact those without wealth more than those with wealth. This would open
heightened scrutiny for almost all economic laws, and some social legislation. See, e.g., San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40–44 (1973) (concern about whether “all local [or national]
fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism” under strict scrutiny).
218. The poor may often be trapped in a system which makes it practically impossible for a
large number to generate income. On the other hand, being poor is not (5) an immutable characteristic,
as individuals can, and sometimes do, rise up and down the income scale. Note under the secondorder reasonableness test of Mathews v. Eldridge, see infra text accompanying note 341, the Constitution
does “impose . . . procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration.” Dandridge,
397 U.S.at 487 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
219. See infra text accompanying notes 220–22.
220. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–70 (1966) (holding the
Equal Protection Clause requires strict scrutiny where fundamental rights and liberties are at stake).
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substantial burden is placed on the right of access to courts;221 and financial
burdens on welfare recipients that substantially burden the right to travel
trigger strict scrutiny.222 In contrast, because there is no fundamental right
in the United States Constitution to equal public school educational funding,
rational review applies for challenges to disparities in funding.223 On the
other hand, under state constitutions, textual language guaranteeing rights
to equal or efficient education may trigger some kind of heightened strict
scrutiny.224
B. Determining Whether Fundamental Rights Exist
The doctrine of substantive due process has two parts: “enumerated”
rights and “unenumerated” rights. Enumerated rights are those rights
textually stated in the Constitution which are deemed fundamental.225 This
includes virtually all the Bill of Rights from the First Amendment to the
Eighth Amendment—except for the Fifth Amendment grand jury
indictment in criminal cases and the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial
in civil cases.226
Unenumerated rights include those rights which the Court has found are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” even though not textually stated
in the Constitution.227 One justification for this branch of fundamental
rights is the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment provides, “[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to

221. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113–20 (1996) (discussing precedent where the
indigent are entitled to counsel).
222. See, Maricopa Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 253–70 (1974) (discussing the
implications of interstate and intrastate travel bans on the indigent); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634–38 (1969).
223. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–44 (1973) (outlining
the Court’s reasoning for not recognized less affluent families as a suspect class).
224. See generally Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929
(Cal. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.
1993); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). See also R. Craig Wood & Bruce D.
Baker, An Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy Concepts of Constitutional Challenges to State
Education Finance Distribution Formulas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 125 (2004) (providing
extensive review of state court decisions).
225. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 826.
226. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 27, at 643–44.
227. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (observing the Due Process
Clause protects fundamental rights and liberties that are “deeply rotted in this Nation’s history and
tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”).
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deny or disparage others retained by the people.”228 This text, taken
literally, does not itself create rights. Instead, the text states a rule of
constitutional interpretation calling upon those who construe the
Constitution to recognize the people have retained some rights not specified
by the Constitution.229 From this perspective, the Ninth Amendment is a
reminder of the background natural law theory that animated the
Constitution’s drafting—individuals have natural rights the government is
created to protect.230
One concern Madison and other founders had in drafting the Bill of
Rights was that under the maxim of construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the expression of one thing implies exclusion of others), the
enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of Rights may suggest the
federal government had plenary power over all other matters.231
As Justice Joseph Story wrote in 1833:
[The Ninth Amendment] was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse,
or ingenious misapplication of the well known maxim, that an affirmation in
particular cases implies a negation in all others; and é converso, that a negation
in particular cases implies an affirmation in all others. The maxim, rightly
understood, is perfectly sound and safe; but it has often been strangely forced
from its natural meaning into the support of the most dangerous political
heresies. The amendment was undoubtedly suggested by the reasoning of the
Federalist on the subject of a general bill of rights.232

228. U.S. Const. Amend. IX. On the Ninth Amendment, see generally CHEMERSINKY, supra
note 16, at 828 (stating the Ninth Amendment functions as a protector of unenumerated rights rather
than granting rights).
229. As previously noted, “The Founding generation disagreed about many things, but the
existence of natural rights was not one of them. From James Madison to Roger Sherman, from
The Federalist Papers to the Antifederalist papers, both supporters and opponents of the Constitution
repeatedly affirmed their shared belief in natural rights.” Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment
Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074–75 (1991) (citations omitted).
230. On this natural law background, see generally David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of
the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313 (1992); Randy Barnett, Reconceiving
the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution,
54 . CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
231. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597, 619 n.92
(2005).
232. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597, 619 (2005)
(citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1898
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
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The classic definition of what rights are “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” occurred in Palko v. Connecticut,233 where Justice Cardozo
asked whether the right is “so rooted in the traditions and [collective]
conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental.” In Griswold v.
Connecticut,234 Justice Goldberg said such rights derive “from experience
with the requirements of a free society.”235 In Bowers v. Hardwick,236
Justice White asked whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”
The definition of fundamental rights has two separate branches. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist phrased in Washington v. Glucksberg,237 the two branches
of what rights are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” are “[1] those
personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply
rooted in our history and traditions, or [2] so fundamental to our concept
of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”238 In general, formalist and Holmesian judges, as
positivists, rely more on history and traditions in their development of
fundamental rights. This is true for formalist judges,239 who focus on
historical traditions at the time of a constitutional provision ratification.
It is also true for Holmesian judges,240 whose deference-to-government
predisposition, suggests fundamental rights should emerge from
legislative and executive traditions, not court action. Natural Law241 and
233. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
234. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
235. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325–26 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
236. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
237. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
238. Id. at 721, 727.
239. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592–95 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing an
originalist approach to deciding on substantive and fundamental rights); Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating in determining fundamental rights the Court
should consider “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 692–97 nn.122–52 (1997).
240. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing in favor of legislative or executive action basis for fundamental rights); Benjamin
N. Smith, Note, Using Popular Referendums to Declare Fundamental Rights, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 123, 124
(2001) (discussing the role of popular referendum in determining fundamental rights).
241. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once
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Instrumentalist242 judges are more willing to embrace the second branch of
fundamental rights analysis concerning evolving standards of “conscience”
and “requirements of a free society,”243 as the judges perceive these to have
developed over time, and thus create a greater concern opening up a
Pandora’s box of newly created rights.
C. First Amendment Free Speech Considerations
The standards of review used in First Amendment cases are relatively
stable. While there are issues surrounding certain aspects of the doctrine,244
these are the kind of ordinary disagreements among members of the Court,
or lacunae in existing doctrine, that do not undermine the basic
predictability of free speech doctrine. Under modern doctrine regarding the
freedom of speech, the Court distinguishes between content-based
regulations involving viewpoint discrimination versus content-based
regulations involving only subject-matter or topic discrimination.245
Viewpoint discrimination occurs when government action is triggered
depending on which side of a topic the individual supports.246 Subjectmatter or discrimination occurs when government action is triggered
whenever a topic or subject-matter is discussed without regard to the

thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”); see also Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (refusing to join Justice Scalia’s limitation on identifying
fundamental right noted at supra note 237).
242. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting Justice Scalia’s
limitation on identifying fundamental rights noted at supra note 239 in favor of “the living charter that
I have taken to be our Constitution”); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 441–42 (1986) (exploring the obligation of Article III
judges to speak for the current community in constitutional interpretation).
243. Brennan, Jr., supra note 242, at 442.
244. As noted supra text accompanying notes 73–76, explicit acknowledgement of the seven
levels of judicial review would benefit a range of free speech issues. There are also a few issues focused
on viewpoint discrimination. See R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech
Doctrine, 52 IND. L. REV. 355, 401–02 (2019) (outlining content-based versus content-neutral
regulations); id. at 402–05 (determining whether viewpoint discrimination triggers strict scrutiny or
whether it is categorically barred); id. at 406–07 (providing an overview of scrutiny issues in grant and
subsidy cases); id. at 408–18 (providing an overview of scrutiny issues in school cases).
245. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 1014 (“The requirement that the government be
content-neutral in its regulation of speech means that the government must be both viewpoint neutral
and subject matter neutral.”).
246. Id. at 1014 (citing Amy Sabin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in
Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1220 (1993) (“Viewpoint neutral means that the
government cannot regulate speech based on the ideology of the message”)).
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person’s views on that topic or subject-matter.247 While any form of
content-based discrimination is troubling,248 viewpoint discrimination is a
more troublesome form of content discrimination because it involves the
government taking sides in a debate.249
The level of scrutiny given to content-based regulations varies depending
on whether the regulation operates in a public forum, on private property,
or in a government-owned nonpublic forum.250 Classic examples of public
fora are places like public streets and public parks, which “have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.”251 Classic
examples of government-owned nonpublic fora are places like prisons or
military bases.252 The Court has also discussed what are called “designated”
or “limited” public forums. Where the forum has been designated as opened
to the public for some purposes, speech regulations relating to those
purposes trigger public forum standards.253 If the forum has been limited
to the public, and thus closed for other purposes, nonpublic forum

247. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 1015 (citing Sabin, supra note 246, at 1217 (“Subject
matter neutral means that the government cannot regulate speech based on the topic of the speech.”));
see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (“The prohibition
[on discussion of nuclear power in bill inserts], the Commission contends, is [constitutional because it
is] related to subject matter rather than to the views of a particular speaker. . . . The First Amendment’s
hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also
to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.”).
248. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victim Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116, 118 (1991) (“[T]he government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the
specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. . . .
In order to justify such differential treatment, ‘the State must show that is regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’” (quoting Ark. Writers’
Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987))).
249. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”).
250. See Kelso, supra note 73, at 293–316.
251. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
252. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966) (holding the Constitution permits
the government to use its own property for “its own lawful discriminatory purpose[,]” in the prison
context); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836–40 (1976) (opining military bases are not traditional public
forums).
253. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (“The Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain
exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in
the first place. . . . Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the
facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”).
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standards apply to regulations related to those limited purposes.254
In terms of ordinary First Amendment review, regulations of speech
involving viewpoint discrimination receive strict scrutiny review, no matter
where the speech occurs.255 Strict scrutiny also applies in a public forum
or on private property for content-based, subject-matter regulations of
speech (i.e., those content-based regulations not involving viewpoint
discrimination).256 In contrast, regulations of speech in a public forum or
on private property that are content-neutral receive intermediate review.257
This intermediate standard was stated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,258
where Justice Kennedy said for the Court:
Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum the government
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of information.’259

For government action in a nonpublic forum, free speech review is much
different. While viewpoint discrimination still triggers strict scrutiny,
subject-matter regulations of speech or content-neutral regulations of
254. Id. at 46 (“[T]he state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation of speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”).
255. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993)
(finding strict scrutiny applies in a limited public forum opened to public); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n,
460 U.S. at 48–49 (finding strict scrutiny for viewpoint discrimination even in a nonpublic forum); see
also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385–92 (1992) (holding viewpoint discrimination triggers
strict scrutiny even in a case involving fighting words not otherwise protected by the
First Amendment). As discussed in Kelso, supra note 244, at 402–05, in some recent public forum
cases the Court has suggested that viewpoint discrimination is categorially barred, rather than triggering
a strict scrutiny analysis.
256. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724–33 (2012); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321–22 (1988). Because it is as intrusive, if not more intrusive, to regulate speech on an individual’s
own private property as opposed to regulating speech in public fora, government action regulating
speech on an individual’s private property triggers the same heightened scrutiny as regulating speech
on public fora. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48–51 (1994) (explaining an ordinance
regulating signs on private property triggers same free speech review as regulation of signs on public
property in Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)).
257. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (reinforcing
the Court’s approach to analyzing content-neutral municipal ordinances under intermediate scrutiny).
258. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
259. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
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speech receive only reasonableness review. As the Court stated in Minnesota
Voters Alliance v. Mansky,260 “[t]he government may reserve such a
[nonpublic] forum ‘for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise,
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.’”
D. Other Constitutional Doctrines
A number of constitutional doctrines change the standard of review
depending on the extent to which under factor (10) the Court becomes more
of less suspicious of the legislative or executive action.261 For example, in
every Dormant Commerce Clause cases, the Court is somewhat suspicious
of legislative action burdening interstate commerce because state
legislatures, whom in-state citizen participate in electing, may have a political
predisposition for advancing local state parochial interests to the detriment
of the national interest.262 Thus, in every Dormant Commerce Clause case
courts determine the extent of the legitimate purposes and whether the
means reflect a clearly excessive burden on interstate commerce.263
The Court’s concerns increase regarding state action because it involves
facial discrimination against interstate commerce or involves a
discriminatory state purpose. As a result, the Court increases the level of
260. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018). There is also a question of who has
the burden to prove the forum is a public forum or nonpublic forum, or whether viewpoint
discrimination or content-neutral regulation exists. On this issue, see Kelso, supra note 244, at 372–75.
In some cases, no free speech review applies. This occurs for regulation of conduct only, see R. Randall
Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Review, a “Reasonableness”
Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 323–24 (2016) (explaining First Amendment analysis does not extend
to conduct); the government funding its own speech, including generic government advertising, or
enlisting parties to convey the government’s message, id. at 317–23; or non-viewpoint discrimination
involving advocacy of illegal conduct, true threats, fighting words, obscenity, or indecent
photographing of children, id. at 324–36, 341–53.
261. For a discussion of factor (10), see supra text accompanying notes 103–06.
262. See supra text accompanying note 103.
263. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471, 476 n.2 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting Commerce Clause analysis empowers courts to
disregard “legislature’s statement of purpose if it considers it a pretext.”); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways
Co., 450 U.S. 662, 670–71 (1981); id. at 691–93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (reasoning if traffic safety
law is not merely a pretext for discrimination, the Court should ask only whether it is rational). As the
district court made these factual conclusions, they are entitled to deference on appeal and subject to
being reversed on appeal only if they are “clearly erroneous.” See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,
144–46 (1986) (explaining the district court’s factual findings are reversible only if they are clearly
erroneous in the instant case).
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scrutiny from the second-order reasonableness balancing test of Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.,264 to the higher level of scrutiny Maine v. Taylor 265 involved.266
Under the Contract Clause, the Court applies rationality review to
standard state regulations which substantially burden, retroactively, the
enforceability of contracts, as in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co.267 In contrast, the Court applies second-order reasonableness
balancing for Contract Clause cases involving a narrow range of actors, as
in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,268 or for impairing the obligations of
the state’s own bonds, as in U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey.269 For
normal Takings Clause cases, the Court applies second-order
reasonableness balancing articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York.270 However, where the Court is more suspicious of legislative
or executive action is when an individual is singled out for individualized

264. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
265. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
266. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 402–03 nn.209–16 (noting while the better view is
facial discrimination against interstate commerce, such as in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 144–46
(1986), merely adopts a third-order reasonableness balancing approach where the government now has
the burden to justify its regulation. Some courts have suggested the “virtual per se” invalidity language
in cases such as City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), means the standard is strict scrutiny,
despite no requirement of compelling interests, but only legitimate interests to regulate.
267. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–13 n.14 (1986)
(providing when a state is not a contracting party “[a]s is customary in reviewing economic and social
regulation, . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a
particular measure.” (quoting U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977))). Note under
modern Contract Clause review, even this rationality kind of review is only triggered if the state
regulation is a “substantial burden” on Contract Clause rights. In the absence of a substantial burden
there is no Contract Clause review at all. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., 459 U.S. at 411–12 (1986). Although there
would naturally be rational review analysis under Equal Protection and Due Process analysis as for any
general social or economic regulation.
268. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
269. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. 1 (1977). On these Contract Clause cases, see generally KELSO
& KELSO, supra note 26, at 957–59 nn.26–33; Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 45–46 nn.269–72)
(citing cases discussing Contracts Clause analysis requirements).
270. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–38 (1978) (holding no
takings because zoning law permitted “reasonably beneficial use” of the property). As the Court
recognized in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001), the Court balances under Penn Central
the burden on the individual in terms of “the economic impact of the regulation [and] its interference
with reasonable investment backed expectations [burdens], the character of the government action
[government action in light of alternatives] and the benefits of the government action [benefits]” to
determine whether given this balance, including whether the individual is left with a reasonable rate of
return on the investment, the burden represents a substantial burden on Takings Clause rights.
See generally Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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administrative action, the Court switches to third-order reasonableness
balancing of Dolan v. City of Tigard.271
A similar third-order reasonableness balancing test was applied in Boerne
v. Flores.272 For Instrumentalist Justices who are not as concerned about
Congress using its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
only a rationality review approach is used to test Congress’ power under
section 5, as in Katzenbach v. Morgan.273
Finally, when concerned with excessive punitive damage awards under
due process, the Court applies a second-order reasonableness balancing
approach under BMW v. Gore.274
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR USING LEVELS OF REVIEW
A. Tiers of Review Versus Single-Standard Alternatives
There are four versions of a single standard of review separate from the
existing levels of review. They are: (1) a flexible sliding scale approach; (2) a
flexible rational review approach; (3) a proportionality approach; and
(4) proportionality review under international law. Despite surface
differences between the existing approach and the single standard
approaches, all approaches use the same building blocks in developing the
relevant standard of review.275 Each standard is based on a means/end
271. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). On these Takings Clause cases, see generally
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 375–378 nn.87–103; Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 43–44
nn.277–80; 49 nn.303–04).
272. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (“[T]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect”). The burden
seems to be on Congress to prove this connection. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (“[F]or Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”). The “congruence and proportionality” test seems
similar to the “rough proportionality” in Dolan Takings Clause cases. See supra note 265 and
accompanying text.
273. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
274. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–85 (1996); see Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650 (adopting
minimum rationality review to test Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
adopting “appropriate legislation” language from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1816),
used in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879)). On this issue, see generally KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 26, at 362–367 nn.31–58; Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 53–54 nn.327–334).
275. See generally R. Randall Kelso, United States Standards of Review Versus the International Standard
of Proportionality: Convergence and Symmetry, 39 OHIO N. L. REV. 455, 457–66 (2013) (dissecting each
approach and finding they share many similarities in their construction and application).
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analysis, focusing both on the ends the government is seeking to advance
and the means used to advance those ends.276 Each standard focuses on
the extent to which the government action is narrowly tailored to not burden
individual rights more than is viewed as appropriate.277 Each standard
analyzes whether the government’s interests are strong enough to justify the
burden on individual rights.278
1.

Flexible Sliding Scale Approach

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,279 Justice Marshall
noted in dissent:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall
into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of
review—strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court’s decisions in the
field of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A principled reading
of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards
in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.280

Instead of supporting explicit creation of a range of levels of review
between rational review and strict scrutiny, Justice Marshall advocated for
what has come to be called a sliding scale approach.281
In Justice Marshall’s words, the sliding scale approach “comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized

276. Id. at 457–60 (discussing “how strong the government end has to be to justify the
regulation and how well the means have to be drafted to achieve that end.”).
277. Id. at 460–63 (discussing “whether the government action is narrowly tailored to not
burden individual rights more than is viewed as appropriate.”).
278. Id. at 463–66 (discussing “whether the marginal benefit of the government regulation to
advance the legitimate public interest is greater than the marginal burdens on the individual.”).
279. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
280. Id. at 98–99.
281. See generally Angelo Guisado, Reversal of Fortune: The Inapposite Standards Applied to Remedial
Race-, Gender-, and Orientation-Based Classifications, 92 NEB. L. REV. 1, 27 (2013) (discussing with approval
Justice Marshall’s “sliding scale” approach); see also Leslie Freidman Goldstein, Between the Tiers:
The New[est] Equal Protection and Bush v. Gore, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 372, 382 (2002) (containing a
similar discussion on the sliding scale standard).
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invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.”282 Justice Marshall then added:
I find in fact that many of the Court’s recent decisions embody the very sort
of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis for which I previously
argued—that is, an approach in which “concentration [is] placed upon the
character of the classification in question, the relative importance to
individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that
they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the
classification.”283

2.

Flexible Single Rational Review Standard

Justice Stevens noted in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,284
“I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the [tiered] analysis
of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain
decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion.” . . . . In my own approach to these cases, I have always asked myself
whether I could find a “rational basis” for the classification at issue.

This version of rational review differs from the standard version of
deferential rationality review stated in cases like Heller v. Doe.285 As
Justice Stevens indicated in Cleburne,
The term “rational,” of course, includes a requirement that an impartial
lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate
public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged
class. Thus, the word “rational”—for me at least—includes elements of
legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the
sovereign’s duty to govern impartially.286

282. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520–21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
284. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
285. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
286. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 452. Justice Stevens continued:
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In addition, Justice Stevens noted,
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What
class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a “tradition of
disfavor” by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the
law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the
disparate treatment?287

How to balance all these considerations is not discussed by
Justice Stevens. He did say in Cleburne:
The answers will result in the virtually automatic invalidation of racial
classifications and in the validation of most economic classifications, but they
will provide differing results in cases involving classifications based on
alienage, gender, or illegitimacy. But that is not because we apply an
“intermediate standard of review” in these cases; rather it is because the
characteristics of these groups are sometimes relevant and sometimes
irrelevant to a valid public purpose, or, more specifically, to the purpose that
the challenged laws purportedly intended to serve.288

As discussed below, absent a more fully developed theory of how to apply
Justice Stevens’ questions in these sorts of cases, the current system of
defined levels of scrutiny to guide lower court decision making is a more
predictable decision making framework.289
3.

Proportionality Review Under American Doctrine

In several cases, Justice Breyer has pushed for what he calls
“proportionality review” for cases not involving rationality review or strict
scrutiny. As he noted in United States v. Alvarez,290

The rational-basis test, properly understood, adequately explains why a law that deprives a person
of the right to vote because his skin has a different pigmentation than that of other voters violates
the Equal Protection Clause. It would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of
height or weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on the basis of skin color. None of these attributes
has any bearing at all on the citizen’s willingness or ability to exercise that civil right.
Id. at 452–53.
287. Id. at 453.
288. Id. at 453–54.
289. See infra text accompanying notes 317–22.
290. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss4/4

50

Kelso: Justifying the Supreme Court’s Standards of Review

2021]

JUSTIFYING THE SUPREME COURT’S STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1023

Regardless of the label, some such approach is necessary if the
First Amendment is to offer proper protection in the many instances in which
a statute adversely affects constitutionally protected interests but warrants
neither near-automatic condemnation (as “strict scrutiny” implies) nor nearautomatic approval (as is implicit in “rational basis” review).291

He added, “I have used the term ‘proportionality’ to describe this
approach.”292
In discussing this approach, Justice Breyer noted that in deciding several
such cases:
[T]his Court has often found it appropriate to examine the fit between
statutory ends and means. In doing so, it has examined speech-related harms,
justifications, and potential alternatives. In particular, it has taken account of
the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the
nature and importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives, the extent
to which the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there
are other, less restrictive ways of doing so. Ultimately the Court has had to
determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is out of
proportion to its justifications.293

However, in the cases Justice Breyer cited as indicative of this approach;
the Court explicitly adopted different tests to what is required to satisfy the
appropriate standard of review.
To pretend all the cases involved the same analysis is erroneous.
The cases Justice Breyer cited as evidence of this proportionality review
involve levels of scrutiny from the second-order reasonableness of Burdick
v. Takushi;294 to third-order reasonableness of Pickering v. Board of
291. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536–37 (2001)
(Breyer, J., concurring); and then Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402–03 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
293. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709.
294. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) (discussing the standards of review
applicable in an election regulation case), discussed in, Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 13–16
nn.79–96); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (concerning the standards of review
applicable in a government employee speech case), discussed in, Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript
at 51–52 nn.307–14); Cen. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(examining the standard applicable to non-misleading commercial speech), discussed in, Kelso, supra
note 4 (manuscript at 32–36 nn.207–34); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–52 (1994)
(considering the standard applicable in a “must-carry” cable regulations case), discussed in, Kelso, supra
note 5 (manuscript at 53–54 nn.327–34).
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Ed.;295 to standard intermediate review, United States v. O’Brien;296 to the
heightened intermediate review of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n of New York;297 to possible “loose strict scrutiny” in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.298 It is not useful to pretend each of these
different standards of review all involve the same level of analysis.
4.

Proportionality Review Under International Law

Rights review in constitutional courts around the world tend to make use
of one basic approach: proportionality.299 There are three basic steps to
proportionality analysis: (1) suitability, which examines whether the
government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest;
(2) necessity, which asks whether the government has used the least restrictive
means to advance its goals, in order to ensure that the government does not
burden the right more than is necessary for the government to achieve its
goals; and (3) balancing “stricto sensu,” which asks whether the marginal benefit
of the government regulation to advance the legitimate public interest is
greater than the marginal burden on the individual.300 Some courts use a
preliminary “fourth step” entitled “legitimacy”.301 Under this step, the
“judge confirms that the government is constitutionally-authorized to take
such a measure” before continuing to apply the suitability, necessity, and
balancing steps of the analysis.302 From an analytic perspective, this inquiry
into legitimacy is best understood as part of the suitability inquiry into
whether the government is rationally advancing a legitimate government
interest, rather than being viewed as an independent inquiry.303

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Cen. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism,
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 72, 74 (2008) (summarizing the material discussed in Kelso, supra note 269,
at 456–57, 496–97).
300. Sweet & Mathews, supra note 299, at 75–76.
301. Id. at 75.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 75 n.8. It should be noted that if both a “legitimacy” and “suitability” analysis are
done, it does not matter whether they are conceived as two separate steps, or as part of one rational
basis means/end. Id. at 74.
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A more detailed discussion of proportionality analysis would note, at
minimum, there are two kinds of narrow tailoring analysis304 and two kinds
of stricto sensu balancing.305 The gives four possible proportionality
approaches: (1) loose narrow tailoring and loose balancing; (2) loose narrow
tailoring and strict balancing; (3) strict narrow tailoring and loose balancing;
and (4) strict narrow tailoring and strict balancing.
Perhaps the adoption of an approach in the middle of the America
standards of review would be the best approach for one consistent
proportionality analysis. This would adopt the looser or intermediate review
form of narrow tailoring analysis, but the stricter “marginal benefit is greater
than marginal burden” approach for stricto sensu balancing. A rigorous strict
scrutiny kind of least restrictive alternative test is perhaps too restrictive on
needed government discretion in many cases. Truly does it make sense for
courts to second-guess government decision making in every case by
requiring the government to prove the government used the least
burdensome alternative in every case? In contrast, requiring the government
to eschew an approach substantially more burdensome than necessary, and
thus not to be on the end of being the most burdensome kind of regulation,
seems a more appropriate of a standard if one uniform standard for every
case is desirable. On the other hand, once the government has done this,
the government should have the responsibility to show the benefits of the
regulation truly outweigh the burdens. This kind of proportionality analysis
would thus be slightly more rigorous than third-order American rationality
review (because it would have an intermediate narrow tailoring component),
but less vigorous than American intermediate review (since it would have
third-order reasonableness balancing, not a requirement that the
government be substantially advancing important or substantial interests,
not merely legitimate interests).306
304. See Kelso, supra note 275, at 460–62 (discussing strict “narrow tailoring” similar to strict
scrutiny’s “least restrictive alternative” approach versus loose intermediate review’s “not substantially
more burdensome than necessary” approach).
305. Id. at 463–64 (discussing strict stricto sensu balancing to ensure “the marginal benefit of the
government regulation . . . is greater than the marginal burden on the individual” versus loose balancing
that seeks to ensure “no factor of significance to either side has been overlooked.”).
306. See id. (explaining such an approach would provide greater structure to current
international proportionality analysis, which would be beneficial). See generally Stefan Sottiaux &
Gerhard van der Schyff, Methods of International Human Rights Adjudication: Towards a More Structured
Decision-Making Process for the European Court of Human Rights, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 115,
115–17 (2008). But this approach rejects any view that stricto sensu balancing should not be part of the
proportionality test. See Georg Nolte, Thin or Thick? The Principle of Proportionality and International
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B. Benefits and Drawbacks of Each
1.

Benefits of Single Standard over Tiered Standards of Review

Several benefits exist with single standards of review. For example, as
has been noted about the single-standard international proportionality
analysis (PA), “PA offers judges the possibility of building trans-substantive
coherence, since it can be applied across the board, to virtually all disputes
involving rights.”307 “[E]mbracing PA is a low-cost move, compared to the
costs of developing an untested alternative . . . . PA is a simple but
comprehensive doctrinal structure, which facilitates diffusion. Lawyers, law
students, and judges can learn the basics quickly and deploy the framework
with ease . . . .”308 To use PA, one does not need the entire superstructure
developed under American constitutional doctrine to decide what test to use
in any case, with seven kinds of scrutiny309 based on consideration of ten
factors to determine the level of review.310
Further, because single standard would apply to every case, it likely would
provide more stringent review of ordinary social and economic regulation
than under American rationality review.311 For persons supportive of court
review of individual economic rights this is a benefit. For example, in
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,312 the Court upheld a regulation
requiring a prescription from an optometrist before getting an optician to
make a new lens.313 Under American rationality review, this was upheld as
being rationally related to a legitimate interest in ensuring regular eye exams,
even if unnecessary in many cases.314 Under international proportionality
review, this regulation is unlikely to survive the narrow tailoring requirement
that the government use the least restrictive means, or at least means not

Humanitarian Law, 4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RGTS. 243, 248–49 (2010) (arguing stricto sensu balancing should
not be part of proportionality analysis because, it is alleged, it places the judge more in the role of a
legislator balancing public policy considerations, rather than in the role of a judge).
307. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the
Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 807 (2011).
308. Id. at 808.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 15–30.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 83–106.
311. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 307, at 807.
312. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
313. Id. at 491.
314. Id. at 487–88.
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substantially more burdensome than necessary, to advance its goal.315 The
regulation might not even survive strictu senso balancing, as the minimal
benefit of the regulation might not be greater than the burden on opticians
and their customers.316
2. Benefits of American Tiers of Scrutiny over Single Standards of
Review
While single standards thus have several benefits, single standards
provide little guidance for American lower courts faced with resolving
constitutional disputes in various settings, which may call for greater or less
deference to government in various contexts. This is particularly true given
growth in lower federal courts’ dockets, which makes it “essentially
impossible for the [Supreme] Court to engage in meaningful ‘error
correction.’”317
In addition, the ease of application of a single standard is overstated.
Under Justice Marshall’s approach, you must consider “the character of the
classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class
discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive,
and the asserted state interests in support of the classification.”318 For
Justice Stevens, the issues relate to the legitimacy and neutrality of the
regulation, including considering what “class is harmed by the legislation,”
has it been subjected to a “tradition of disfavor” by our laws, what “public
purpose” is served by the law, and what is “the characteristic of the
disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment.”319 For
Justice Breyer, consider “the seriousness” of the harm, the “nature and
importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives,” the “extent to
which the provision will tend to achieve those objectives,” and whether
“there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.”320 Under the tiers of
315. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 307, at 838–41 (discussing Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc. from this perspective). See also note 304 and accompanying text (discussing whether the
international narrow tailoring requirement is more like American strict scrutiny or intermediate review).
316. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 307 at 842–43. See Terence Daintith, The Constitutional
Protection of Economic Rights, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 56, 82–86 (2004) (comparing European “right to
commerce” law with post-1937 American deference to economic regulations under the Carolene Products
and Lee Optical doctrine).
317. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the
Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 996 (2000).
318. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99; see supra text accompanying notes 275–76.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 286–87.
320. See supra text accompanying note 293.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

55

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 4

1028

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:973

review, the Court has structured considerations relating to such matters as
legitimacy, a tradition of disfavor, the seriousness of the harm, or characteristic of the
disadvantaged class and provided guidance to lower courts how stringently to
review the legislation.321 Leaving everything to an ad hoc balancing in every
case promotes neither stability nor predictability in the law.
Furthermore, American strict scrutiny tends to ensure a higher level of
review than any of the forms of a single standard of review. For persons
supportive of court review of individual rights in those areas triggering strict
scrutiny that can be a real advantage. For example, First Amendment
freedom of speech protections, even in the context of hate speech, is
vigorous in America, more so than hate speech regulation in Europe.322
VI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND COMMITMENT TO REASONED
DECISION MAKING
“Justice Kennedy has remarked, ‘[R]eason, which is the distinguishing
mark of the human race, must be embodied in the law if our civilization is
to aspire to excellence.’”323 More precise attention to elements of standards
of review for rational basis and reasonableness balancing would make them
more reasoned, predictable, and scientific.324 The same thing is true for

321. On legitimacy, see supra text accompanying notes 94, 103–06 on process concerns of
factor (3) and (10) on whether the legislative process can be trusted, and supra text accompanying
notes 96–98 on substantive factors on (5) immutable characteristics and (6) not the product of
individual choice. On tradition of disfavor, see supra text accompanying note 99 on factor (7) history of
discrimination. On seriousness of the harm, see supra text accompanying notes 89–93 on factor (1) on
constitutional text, purpose, and history and factor (2) on fundamental rights. On characteristic of the
disadvantage class, see supra text accompanying notes 95 on factor (4) and its focus on discrete and insular
minorities. Factors (8) on judicial competence and factor (9) on Pandora’s box concerns are sensible
additional concerns with judicial review not particularly well-captured by any of the single standards of
review. See supra text accompanying notes 100–02.
322. See generally John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539
(2006).
323. Anthony Kennedy, Assoc. Just. of the Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Commencement Address at
Univ. of the Pacific, McGeorge Sch. of L. (May 21, 1988), cited in KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26,
at 157 n.97; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
1690–93 (1984) (“[G]overnment action” must reflect something other than “raw political power . . . .”).
This principle is based on eighteenth-century natural law Enlightenment commitment to “reason” and
“reasoned elaboration of the law.” See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 157 nn.96–97; 367–69
nn.60–70. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating the federal judiciary
lacks ultimate “influence over either the sword or the purse,” and thus “may truly be said to have
neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.”).
324. See Kelso, supra note 2 (“The Structure of Rational Basis and Reasonableness Review”).
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intermediate review325 as it is for strict scrutiny.326 Additional elements of
reasoned decision making involving all elements of review are discussed
below.
A. Rationality Review: Legitimate Versus Illegitimate Interests
One aspect of modern standards of review doctrine is that “if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”327 In a sequence of cases, the Court applied this principle to both
federal and state action involving various kinds of discrimination.328 The
idea behind these cases is that irrational hostility toward a particular group
cannot be used to satisfy even rationality review.329
Judges more willing to defer to historical or traditional attitudes are
willing to count irrational prejudices as legitimate if they reflect the attitudes
of the electorate as reflected in legislation.330 For example, dissenting in
325. See Kelso, supra note 4 (“The Structure of Intermediate Review”).
326. See Kelso, supra note 5 (“The Structure of Strict Scrutiny Review”).
327. See Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis in original) (using “bare congressional
desire” language); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“[I]nvidious racial discrimination” is an
illegitimate interest); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (“[S]egregation of children
in public schools solely on the basis of race” violates equal protection).
328. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534, 537 (1973) (“[P]urpose to discriminate against hippies” not
legitimate interest to prevent “hippie communes” from food stamp program); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (discussing prejudice against interracial marriage illegitimate); Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. at 448 (holding prejudice against the mentally impaired to be an illegitimate governmental
interest); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (agreeing “animus” against a politically unpopular
group, in this case animus based upon sexual orientation, an illegitimate governmental interest).
329. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Why Popular Sovereignty Requires the Due Process of Law to
Challenge “Irrational or Arbitrary” Statutes, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 355, 368–69 (2016) (“Such
improper ends include: (a) the end of assisting favored persons or groups at the expense of other
citizens; (b) the end of harming some individuals or groups; or (c) the end of stigmatizing or making
costlier the exercise of a liberty of which some disapprove.”); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional
Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 926 (2012) (“[A]nimus is present where the public laws are
harnessed to create and enforce distinctions between social groups—that is, groups of persons
identified by status rather than conduct.”).
330. Following a focus on historical attitudes and deference to legislative and executive practice,
some judges adopt the view such that legislation can constitute a legitimate government interest since
they reflect the views of the majority, which should be followed in a democracy. Romer, 517 U.S.
at 640–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–91 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing precedent upholding law banning homosexual sodomy as constitutional based on
traditional moral disapproval of homosexual conduct); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896)
(“In determining the question or reasonableness, [a court] is at liberty to act with reference to the
established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

57

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 4

1030

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:973

Lawrence v. Texas,331 Justice Scalia noted if the belief of a state’s citizens that
certain forms of sexual behavior are “immoral and unacceptable” was not a
legitimate interest, then state laws “against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity” likewise were subject to constitutional attack. Judicial decision
making based upon reason provides an answer to this critique.
Most major secular philosophic doctrines adopt a background principle
that individuals should not behave in a self-interested capacity, but should
treat others with “equal concern and respect” giving equal weight to others’
interests as one’s own.332 This equal concern and respect principle is
reflected in the foundational religious doctrine of all major religions that
affirm as moral the basic principle of “love thy neighbor as thyself,” also
phrased as the Golden Rule of “do unto others as you would have them do
unto you.”333 The notion is also reflected in rational thought based upon
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot
say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances
is unreasonable . . . .”).
331. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas,
J., dissenting).
332. See R. Randall Kelso, Modern Moral Reasoning and Emerging Trends in Constitutional and Other
Rights Decision-Making Around the World, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 433, 434–440 (2011), (citing, inter alia,
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1977)) (“Government must not only treat
people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect.”)); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 17–22 (1971) (“The Original Position and Justification”); 1 ENCYC. OF ETHICS 666 (Becker
& Becker eds. 1992) (“This yields the first formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, the Formula
of Universal Law: ‘Act only on a maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law. . . .’
This leads Kant to a new formulation of the categorical imperative: ‘Act always so that you treat
humanity, in your own person or another, never merely as a means but also at the same time as an end
in itself.’”) (discussing generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (1785); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max Muller trans., London, The
MacMillan Co. 2d rev. ed. 1886); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 221 (1759),
cited in Kelso & Kelso, supra note 26, at 510–11 n.11 (considering the “impartial spectator” and its
principle that we “must view him, neither from our own place nor yet from his, but from the place and
with the eyes of a third person who has no particular connection with either, and who judges impartially
between us.”)).
333. Mark 12:31 (“Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.”); Kelso, supra note 332, at 436
(citing Isaac Herzog, 1 THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 386 (Soncino Press 1936) (“[B]ring
the law as much as possible into line with the highest ethical norms, [which] commanded, ‘Love thy
neighbour as thyself’ and ‘Love the stranger as thyself.’” (citing Leviticus, 19:19, 19:33–34.”)), cited in
Amihai Radzyner, Between Scholar and Jurist: The Controversy over the Research of Jewish Law Using Comparative
Methods at the Early Time in the Field, 23 J.L. & REL. 189, 208 (2007–2008)); Geoffrey R. Stone, The World
of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (“For Jefferson, the fundamental
precepts of morality, which he believed were held in common in all religions, were captured by Jesus’
maxims, ‘Treat others as you would have them treat you’ and ‘Love [thy] neighbor as thyself.’”) (citing
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insight that “to comprehend accurate physical reality, in an Einsteinian
universe of relativity, it is necessary to give equal concern and respect to
others’ frames of reference in addition to one’s own in order to give an
adequate account of the physical universe.”334
One obvious corollary to the principle of giving persons equal concern
and respect means that “self-interested coercion or exploitation of other
persons is wrong.” Coercive sexual practices, as well as exploitative sexual
practices, thus violate the principle of equal concern and respect. These
principles of equal concern and respect and arbitrary coercion is wrong
make it possible to draw distinctions among Justice Scalia’s legislative list,
supra note 331. Bestiality can be prohibited as there can be no meaningful
consent given by animals.335 Prostitution336 or obscene speech that “lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”337 also raise clear issues
of exploitative sexual activity. Bigamy (or polygamy) raises issues of whether
one can give equal concern and respect to multiple spouses, particularly
given the historical practice of exploitation of women often accompanying
societies permitting men to have multiple wives.338 Concerns with the
KERRY S. WALTERS, RATIONAL INFIDELS: THE AMERICAN DEISTS 181 (1992)); Zainah Anwar &
Jana S. Rumminger, Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: Challenges, Possibilities, and Strategies for
Reform, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1541 (2007) (discussing “the recognition of equality between
men and women in Islam, the imperative of ijtihad (independent reasoning to arrive at a legal principle)
in modern times, [and] the dynamics between what is universal for all times and what is particular to
seventh century Arabia . . . .”); Feisal Abdul Rauf, What is Islamic Law?, 57 MERCER L. REV. 595,
599–600 (2005) (“Islamic Law, called Sharia, starts off from” these two commandments Jesus
instructed his people to follow—“love the Lord thy God” and “love thy neighbor as thyself.”); R. Mary
Hayden Lemmons, Tolerance, Society, and the First Amendment: Reconsiderations, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 75,
89 (2005) (“Hinduism: ‘One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious to one’s
own self’; and, Buddhism: ‘Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.’”).
334. Kelso, supra note 332, at 457. For further discussion of this insight, including locating the
views of Thomas Hobbes in LEVIATHAN (1651), Friedrich Nietzche in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
(1886), or Robert Nozick in ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), that rational thought is selfinterested in a Newtonian understanding of physics and childish egocentrism, see Kelso, supra
note 332, at 434, 454–62.
335. See, e.g., Antonio M. Haynes, The Bestiality Proscription: In Search of a Rationale, 21 ANIMAL
LAW 121, 148–49 (2014) (grounding laws against bestiality in concerns with coercion).
336. See Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 1664–65 (2010) (discussing views that all
prostitution always “is exploitative and degrading to women” or in any event “voluntary prostitutes
represent only a small minority of ‘prostituted women.’”), and sources cited therein.
337. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
338. On the topic of polygamy, see generally Cyra Akila Choudhury, Between Traditions and
Progress: A Comparative Perspective on Polygamy in the United States and India, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 963 (2012)
(discussing polygamy from the perspective of a concern to ban exploitation, while recognizing that in
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possibility of inevitable exploitation of deep emotions built up between
family members suggest consent could never be truly non-exploitative in the
context of adult incest.339 Further, as a matter of history and tradition, the
first branch of substantive due process analysis, the legislative practice of
virtually every state banning obscenity, prostitution, bigamy and polygamy,
and incest, and a vast majority banning bestiality, is different than only
thirteen states banning sodomy when Lawrence v. Texas was decided.340
On the other hand, it may well be true any attempt to regulate fornication
would raise difficult problems of justification.341 Even with respect to
adultery, while adulterous conduct in most circumstances would violate the
principle of giving one’s spouse equal concern and respect342—though it
would be different if both parties knowingly and voluntarily agreed to have
an “open marriage”—the question would arise whether this morality is a
matter for state regulation or for private individual response, such as filing
for divorce. Few states have criminal laws against fornication still on their
books, and only a dozen or so states still have civil actions for alienation of
affection.343 Around twenty states still have laws criminalizing adultery, but
such laws are almost never enforced, with novel penalties when
some cases polygamy might not involve coercion or exploitation of the parties involved); see also
Stephanie Forbes, “Why Just Have One?”: An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws Under the Establishment
Clause, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1517, 1541–46 (2003) (discussing account more sympathetic to polygamy and
how such relationships can foster women’s self-independence and children’s welfare); see also Brown v.
Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting sheriff’s policy in a Utah county only to
prosecute for bigamy or polygamy where someone commits “child or spouse abuse, domestic violence,
welfare fraud, or any other crime”).
339. See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337, 348–55 (2004)
(discussing incest laws and regulatory justifications, including “protecting relations within the family
from becoming overly-sexualized”). Note this argument does not affect relationships where one adult
partner, perhaps for inheritance-based reasons, adopts the other adult partner thus technically creating
an incestuous relationship under the law of many states. See Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion
Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect Adults Who Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest
Prosecution?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 95, 95–98 (2009).
340. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (noting only thirteen states had criminal
sodomy laws in 2003, nine against both same-sex and opposite sex sodomy, and four against same-sex
sodomy only; even in those states there was a “pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting
adults acting in private”). On “history and tradition” representing the “first branch” of substantive
due process analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 237–43.
341. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 369–71 (Va. 2005) (holding the state fornication
statute unconstitutional after Lawrence, and thus preventing fornication barring suit for herpes
transmission).
342. R. Randall Kelso, Modern Moral Reasoning and Emerging Trends in Constitutional and Other Rights
Decision-Making Around the World, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 433, 435 (2011).
343. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (discussing state laws).
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enforced.344 Thus, the legislative and executive practice with respect to
fornication and adultery is much like Lawrence.345 That such laws exist,
however, can make a difference in divorce cases regarding custody and
financial arrangements, or other civil contexts, such as barring a tort case
involving herpes transmission, or refusing to extend protection to
cohabitors under laws prohibiting housing discrimination, if adultery or
fornication has occurred.346 In Obergefell v. Hodges, the issue of the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage was resolved in favor of a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage.347
B. Reasonableness Balancing
It is typically thought a person behaves “reasonably” when the person
engages sensibly in a “cost-benefit” analysis.348 That is, in why the Court
balances benefits against burdens in cases involving second-order
reasonableness balancing. For example deciding whether some state law is
a “clearly excessive” burden under the Dormant Commerce Clause Pike v.
Bruce Church test, the court balances the benefits of the law against its
burdens on interstate commerce.349 Similarly, under the BMW v. Gore test,
the Court balances benefits and burdens to determine whether a punitive
damage award is “grossly excessive.”350 When the court applies the test of
344. See generally Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After
Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837 (2006) (noting twenty-three states continue to
recognize adultery as a crime, although statutes rarely enforced).
345. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570.
346. Hillary Greene, Note, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in
Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174–78 (1997).
347. Obergefell v. Hodges, 579 U.S. 644, 675–81 (2015). For a good article underscoring
regulation on grounds of traditional “morals” accepted from 1873–1954, see Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233,
1247–58 (2004). Since 1954 the Court has almost never upheld a statute based on “moral” grounds
alone, except for the 5–4 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–94 (1986), which was
overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–72, 575.
348. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (considering the burden on
interstate commerce against statute’s benefits).
349. Under Pike, the Court considers: (1) the state’s “legitimate local public interest”; (2) the
means by which the statute achieves these ends, including whether the benefits of the statute could be
promoted “as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities;” and (3) given this, whether the “burden”
on inter-state commerce is “clearly excessive” given the statute’s benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
350. Under BMW, the Court considers: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct; (2) the
ratio between the punitive damage award and the compensatory damage award; and (3) sanctions for
comparable misconduct in the law, to determine whether the challenger can show the punitive damage
award is grossly excessive. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–85 (1996).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021

61

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 4

1034

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:973

U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey to review government action
burdening the state’s own contract obligations under the Contract Clause,
the Court balances benefits and burdens to determine whether the
government action is “reasonable and necessary.”351 A similar balancing
test is done under the Takings Clause for purposes of the Penn Central
test.352
The same balancing is done in other constitutional doctrines. The Court
analyzes both benefits and burdens under the Procedural Due Process
doctrine of Mathews v. Eldridge.353 The right of government workers to
speak on matters of public concern also involves a balancing test of benefits
and burdens under the Pickering test.354 A similar balancing takes
place under the access to ballot/right to vote cases of Anderson v.
Celebrezze355 and Burdick v. Takushi.356 Even the reasonableness test
351. Under U.S. Trust, the challenger has the burden of showing—given a three-part factor
balancing of the state’s legitimate interest; the statute’s means, including whether the benefits of the
statute could be served “equally well” by an “evident and more moderate course”; and the burden on
individual contract rights—that the burden was not “reasonable and necessary” given the statute’s
benefit. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 30, 31 (1977).
352. Under Penn Central, the Court balances the burden on the individual in terms of the
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations,
and whether it leaves the individual with a reasonable rate of return on the investment against the
benefits of the government action to determine whether the regulation is a “taking” as a too “sever[e]”
burden on the individual. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124–25, 136–38
(1978).
353. Under Mathews, the Court considers: (1) “the private interest” that the government action
will burden; (2) the means by which existing procedures achieve the government’s ends, including “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . through the present procedures used and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedu[res];” and (3) “the Government’s interest” or ends in the case.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
354. Under Pickering, the Court considers: (1) the government’s legitimate ends in “promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees;” (2) prevails in a balance against
“the interests of the [employee]” in free speech; (3) including whether the government could act with
more “narrowly drawn grievance procedures.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 572 n.4
(1968).
355. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
356. Under Burdick and Celebrezze, “the state’s important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify reasonable [nondiscriminatory] restrictions. . . . A court . . . must [first] weigh ‘the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”’ Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 428,
433–34 (1992) (quoting Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788–89). It then must identify and evaluate “the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Id. at 434
(quoting Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 789). In passing judgment, the Court also must consider “the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. at 434 (quoting Celebrezze,
460 U.S. at 789).
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Chief Justice Roberts used in Morse v. Frederick357 involved considering
whether the burden on free speech rights was determined to be reasonable
in light of the “important” benefit of “educating students of the dangers of
illegal drug use.”358
In each of these cases, the Court balances the benefits of the government
action against the burdens to determine whether the government action is
reasonable or “excessive.” In the context of Dormant Commerce Clause
review, Justice Scalia noted long ago such a reasonableness balancing tests
involve weighing considerations, which are not precisely equal.359
However, in Dormant Commerce Clause cases, and the other doctrines
stated above, the Court performs that exact balancing inquiry. The Court
has shown over decades that it can be done. That is part of the act of
judging. Over time, the balance becomes more predictable as cases get
decided.360
For this reason, any argument in an isolated area of the law against
second-order reasonableness balancing because it is not, in practice, a
manageable test is flawed.361 Such an argument would represent result357. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
358. Under Morse, the Court balanced the burden on free speech rights in light of the important
benefit of “educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use” to determine whether the
principal’s action was reasonable. Id. at 405–10.
359. Benedix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[J]udging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”). See Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (1989) (noting under balancing
tests “predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated.”).
360. Indeed, under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court has required administrative
agencies to balance costs versus benefits in deciding whether to adopt regulations in order to satisfy
their obligation to engage in reasoned decision making. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 749–53 (2015)
(stating it would be unreasonable for EPA not explicitly to consider costs before deciding whether
regulation is appropriate and necessary under the Clean Air Act); id. at 764–65 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(taking costs into account in deciding how much to regulate adequate without an independent explicit
cost analysis). As another example, the theory of modern negligence law in torts is based on such a
cost-benefit analysis. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947) (“[I]f
the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends on whether B is less than
L multiplied by P . . . .”).
361. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have rejected the Court’s normal Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359–60 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 361–62 (Thomas, J., concurring). They have also rejected Court review of punitive
damages under BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996). Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515
(Scalia, J., concurring). However, Justice Scalia did apply, and Justice Thomas continues to apply,
balancing in all the other areas mention here, and the remaining conservatives on the Court, including
Chief Justice Roberts, have applied balancing in all the doctrines mentioned above. See supra text
accompanying notes 348–58, 360.
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oriented jurisprudence at its worst, as seemed to recently occur in June
Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo362 in Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring
opinion.363 Where a fundamental right is involved, review should always
be higher than minimum rationality review, as Justice Scalia noted
respecting the Second Amendment in Heller.364
C. Means Analysis
As part of overall consideration of ends, means, and burdens, there are
three kind of means inquiries. The first is rational review, where the
government action must be rationally related to legitimate interests, and
substantial deference given to the government’s judgment on rationality
under Heller v. Doe and Williamson v. Lee Optical.365 Prior to 1937, the Court
phrased this doctrine as reasonably related.366 This may be similar to what
Chief Justice Roberts mentioned in Russo.367 In theory, one could have two
362. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (plurality opinion).
363. Id. at 2135–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting reasonableness as “whether there
was a substantial burden, not whether benefits outweighed burdens . . . .”). This approach is
inconsistent with all the other “reasonableness balancing” discussed at supra text accompanying
notes 348–58, 360, and inconsistent with our general sense of how a reasonable person makes
decisions.
364. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (citing United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)) (minimum rationality review cannot be used when dealing
with a fundamental right, like the Second Amendment, because then “the Second Amendment would
be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws”). Of course, if you
conclude there is no fundamental right, then minimum rationality review would be appropriate. In the
context of abortion law, that would involve overruling Casey, as Casey reaffirmed the core holding in
Roe that a fundamental right was involved. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
877–79 (1992) (noting “[o]ur adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central
holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding.”). Absent such overruling, since the Russo case
involved at a minimum a less than substantial burden on unenumerated fundamental right, the Court
should adopt a second-order reasonableness balancing approach as held in Hellerstedt and the plurality
in Russo. See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2212–13 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016)). For further discussion supporting the Russo plurality’s understanding of
Casey and rejecting Chief Justice Roberts’ view as inconsistent with less than substantial burdens on
fundamental rights generally, see Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 35–39 nn.221–48).
365. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993) (providing an examination of rational basis
review in an equal protection case); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. of Okla., 348 U.S. 483,
487–89 (1955) (examining the application of rational basis in a due process case). See Kelso, supra
note 2 (manuscript at 6 nn.41–46; 9–10 nn.67–69).
366. Kelso, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4–6 nn.31–40) (citing, inter alia, Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe
R.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897) (“[L]aw ‘must always rest on some difference which bears a
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed . . . .’”)).
367. In his separate concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts said he viewed Casey and Hellerstedt as
asking only (1) whether the regulation is a substantial obstacle on abortion choice and (2) even if not,
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kinds of rational review: standard substantially deferential rational review
and Chief Justice. Roberts’ reasonable rational review.368 Since 1937, the
Court has decided the substantially deferential rationality review test of
Heller and Lee Optical is appropriate for standard social and economic
regulation.369 There seems no real point to adding another level of
reasonable rational review that would call for justification of whether that
reasonable review or standard rationality review applies. Where some level
higher applies, as for less than substantial burdens on fundamental rights,
the full second-order reasonableness review balancing test used in many
doctrines is available to be done.370
For intermediate scrutiny, the Court adopts the requirement the
regulation must be substantially related to advancing the government
interests.371 While there is no exact mathematical test for when
government action is substantially related to advancing ends, rather than
merely rationally or reasonably related, over time cases have helped clarify
how much of a regulation is required to satisfy that standard,372 and what
connection will not satisfy that standard.373 In all these cases, it is based on
is the regulation reasonably related to a legitimate interest, but that determination is only made by
considering whether it is reasonable to think the law provides some benefits, not a balancing of benefits
and burdens. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2135–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
368. See generally Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993) (regarding rational review in the
context of equal protections); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. of Okla., 348 U.S. 483,
487–89 (1955) (concerning rational review in the context of due process).
369. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320–21; Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487–89.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 348–58. On the Heller and Lee Optical tests, see supra
text accompanying note 16.
371. See supra text accompanying note 21.
372. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59–60 (2001) (requiring some legitimation or finding of
paternity made before the age of eighteen substantially related to determining a parent-child
relationship exists for illegitimate child born to citizen father and non-citizen mother); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 783, 800 (1989) (“[C]ity’s . . . interest in limiting sound volume” during
concerts in Central Park is substantially related to “the requirement that the city’s sound technician
control the mixing board during performances.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (banning
burning a draft card substantially related to effective function of Selective Service System); Occupy
Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Minn. 2011) (validating Minneapolis’s
action when it cut off electricity to Occupy Minneapolis protestors assembled in public plazas or when
it banned tents in the plaza; city was substantially advancing content-neutral interest in controlling the
aesthetic appearance of the plazas).
373. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (imposing a five-year residency
requirement after age of fourteen on U.S. citizen fathers, but only one year for citizen mothers, before
they can transmit citizenship to child born out-of-wedlock abroad to non-U.S. citizen violates
intermediate review, as not substantially related to a concern that unwed citizen fathers care less about,
or have less contact with, their children than unwed citizen mothers; harsher five-year requirement
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a reasonable person’s view about the substantiality of the relationship, not
the subjective view of any legislature or individual about what appears
substantial to them.374
For intermediate review with bite and strict scrutiny, the requirement is
the government action be “directly and substantially related” to advancing
the government’s interests.375 While there is no exact mathematical test for
when government action is directly related to advancing ends, over time
cases have helped clarify how much of a regulation is required to satisfy that
standard,376 and what connection will not satisfy that standard.377 As with
applied to both unwed father and mother until Congress passes gender neutral provision); Clark v.
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 457–61 (1988) (requiring illegitimate children to seek support from their putative
father within six years of birth, but no such restriction on legitimate children, not substantially related
to orderly administration of justice); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199–203 (1976) (barring only males
aged eighteen through twenty from buying low-alcohol 3.2% beer was not substantially related to the
goal of traffic safety because the statute does not ban the eighteen to twenty year-old males from
drinking beer bought by female companions or twenty-one-year-old males and statistics showing 2%
of eighteen to twenty-year-old males were likely to be arrested for drunk driving an unduly tenuous
fit); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545 (D.S.C. 2011) (providing South Carolina’s attempt
to ban all protestors after six p.m. from occupying park likely unconstitutional, justifying preliminary
injunction).
374. For example, in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541–46 (1996), the Court held
Virginia Military Institute’s categorical exclusion of women was not substantially related to an effective
adversative method of instruction, as the evidence revealed some women could meet VMI’s physical
standards and its implementing methodology. The issue was not whether VMI thought women could
meet the standards, but whether in fact the standards could be met.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. The direct part focuses on the immediate causal
connection between the statute and the benefits, with no unnecessary under inclusiveness.
376. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20–30 (2010) (deciding the
Patriot Act’s provision criminalizing providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations,
including providing “expert advice or assistance” even to lawful, non-violent activities such as applying
to the United Nations for humanitarian aid, is directly and substantially related to combating terrorism
because money is fungible and aid to one part of terrorist organization makes all parts of the terrorist
organization stronger); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623–29 (1984) (opining gender
antidiscrimination laws requiring large, nationwide social groups to admit women satisfy strict scrutiny
under the Freedom of Association because the laws were directly and substantially related to advancing
compelling government interests in ending such discrimination); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
254–56 (1982) (requiring all employers, including Amish employers, to pay social security taxes directly
and substantially related to the compelling interest in the financial solvency of the Social Security
System); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569–71 (1976)
(banning promotional advertising on energy use by electrical utilities directly related to reducing
demand for electric use).
377. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)
(finding no direct causal link between criminalizing lying about receiving a military medal and
protecting the honor and integrity of the military award system) (citing Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)) (determining California cannot show a direct causal link between violent
video games and harm to minors); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509–11 (2005) (stating there is
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intermediate review, in all these cases the decision is based on a reasonable
person’s view about the “directness” of the relationship, not the subjective
view of any legislature or individual about what appears substantial to
them.378
D. Burden Analysis
1.

Normal Burden Analysis

For minimum rationality review, the government action must not be an
irrational, arbitrary, or capricious burden.379 This test has been easy to
meet. For example, in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer380 the
Supreme Court held a subway system completely banning hiring former
heroin addicts who had underdone methadone treatment was rational even
though according to the Court’s opinion probably 75% of the persons
burdened by the Act had no heroin problem. This possibly made the statute
substantially more burdensome than necessary and thus invalid under
intermediate review.381

no direct causal link between racially segregating prisoners for initial period of incarceration and
reducing violence in prisons); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275–76 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (providing minority role models was not directly related to responding to any compelling
government interest in remedying any racial discrimination in employment which had previously
occurred ); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1215–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding an
FDA rule requiring tobacco companies to place graphic images on all packages of cigarettes sold in the
United States unconstitutional, since FDA did not provide evidence the graphic warnings would
substantially and directly advance its interest in reducing smoking rates).
378. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 313 (2013) (noting a court cannot
rely on good faith assurances that the program uses race in a permissible manner but must instead give
“close analysis to the evidence of how the program works in practice.”).
379. As the Court noted in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592 n.39
(1979) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)) (“[L]egislative classifications
are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State’s objectives.”). The question is thus
whether Congress achieved its purpose by burdening innocent individuals in an arbitrary or irrational
way.
380. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
381. Id. at 576 (discussing the incidence of drug use among methadone maintenance program
users “may often approach[, or] exceed[,] 25%.”). Invalidity under intermediate review would be true
as long as some more individualized consideration of applicants would be effective in weeding out
problem candidates, or if some more narrowly tailored ban would effectively advance the government’s
interest, such as, as mentioned in the Court’s opinion, a “rule denying methadone users any
employment unless they had been undergoing treatment for at least a year and . . . [a] rule denying even
the most senior and reliable methadone users any of the more dangerous jobs in the system.” Id. at
589.
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When engaging in the balance of benefits and burdens under
reasonableness balancing, both the amount of the benefit and the amount
of the burden should be determined by looking to how much the burden
would appear to a “reasonable man.” As noted in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board,382 in a facial challenge to a law, the Court should consider in
determining burdens the “nature, extent, and likely impact” of the burden
on “reasonably diligent” individuals as what matters is a “general assessment
of the burden,” not “peculiar circumstances of individual[s].”383 In Gonzales
v. Carhart,384 the Court phrased the issue as determining the amount of
burden on a “large fraction of relevant cases[,]” the use of the term
“relevant” is important. As the controlling plurality opinion noted in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,385 “[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant.”386
This approach to burdens also leaves open the possibility of a more
individualized challenge to a law if special circumstances so counsel. For
example, the Court indicated in Gonzales that while the law was not an undue
burden in the context of a “large fraction of relevant cases,” there is the
possibility of finding a “substantial obstacle” to abortion choice given an
individual woman’s medical condition.387 It must also be remembered that
under the Equal Protection Clause there can be “class of one” cases where
the focus would be on the specific individual’s burden.388

382. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 206–07 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738, 742 (1974) (emphasis omitted)).
383. Id.
384. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
385. Planned Parenthood of Se Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
386. Id. at 894. For this reason, the Court noted a spousal notification law was a substantial
obstacle and undue burden on a married woman despite only about 20% of women who obtain
abortions are married and 95% of such women notify their husbands, meaning the effects of the
spousal notification law would only affect 1% of all abortions. For the women whom the statute would
restrict—married women who would not want to notify their husbands—the law was a substantial
obstacle because, as the Court stated, “there are millions of women in this country who are the victims
of regular physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands” and “[s]hould these women
become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their
decision to obtain an abortion.” Id. at 893–94.
387. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 126, 168.
388. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (explaining what a “class
of one” case is). For a discussion of “class of one” cases, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 1085
n.8.
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Oppressiveness in applying intermediate review and strict scrutiny
is also based on court consideration of burdens as viewed by the
reasonable person.389 Court cases under intermediate review390 and strict
scrutiny391 are consistent with this approach. Any other approach would
create “a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself.”392
2.

Specialized Free Exercise of Religion Considerations

The Free Exercise Clause applies to protect individuals’ sincerely held
religious beliefs.393 Under traditional Free Exercise Clause doctrine prior
to 1963, the Free Exercise Clause was interpreted to protect religious
opinions from government interference, but the protection did not carry over
to religious actions. Thus, in Reynolds v. United States,394 the Court upheld a
bigamy conviction despite the law burdening Mormon religious practice

389. See Kelso, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13–15 nn.85, 90–93, 96); Kelso, supra note 5
(manuscript at 13–14, 20–22 nn.87–94, 135–46).
390. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56–58 (1994) (discussing how sign regulation is a
substantial burden that does not leave open ample alternative channels of communication following
court consideration of (1) “displaying a sign from one’s own residence often carries a message” distinct
from what can be conveyed by other means; (2) “residential signs are . . . unusually cheap and
convenient form[s] of communication[,] [e]specially for persons of modest means or limited
mobility[;]” (3) “[a] special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture
and our law[;]” and (4) “[the] need to regulate temperate speech from the home” is less pressing than
the need to “mediate among various competing uses” for streets and other public facilities); Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 788–93, 802 (1989) (insisting bandshell performers at the
Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in Central Park use of sound-amplification equipment and city a
provided sound technician is not a substantial burden and leaves open ample alternative channels for
musical expression; any sincerely held belief the group had that the city’s requirement was a substantial
burden on their musical expression was irrelevant).
391. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–49, 653–59 (2000) (exploring the
burden an antidiscrimination law imposed “significantly affect[ed]” the Boy Scout’s freedom of
association, while the antidiscrimination law was held not to “materially interfere” with the ideas of the
organization and thus was not objectively a “serious” burden in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623–29 (1984) or Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
544–50 (1987), despite any members’ subjective views to the contrary). See also Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579–80 (1995) (forcing parade organizers to
permit a gay pride float was objectively too substantially burdensome on the organizer’s rights to
promote their own message of Irish-American pride in the parade).
392. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
393. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965). See also Cavanaugh v. Bartelt,
178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 824 (D. Neb. 2016) (concluding a prisoner’s worship of Flying Spaghetti Monster
is a parody, not a sincerely held religious belief).
394. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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involved in the case.395 Similarly, in Braunfeld v. Brown,396 the Court refused
to require an exception to a Sunday closing law for a Jewish merchant whose
faith required him to close on Saturday. The Court said there was a
legitimate interest in one uniform day of rest for all workers, and merely
because the law, as applied, would result in a religious Jew closing on two
days did not raise a Free Exercise Clause problem.397 Whether the rational
review test applied in the case was based on the Free Exercise Clause, or
whether there was no Free Exercise review for burdens on religious actions,
but rational review applied under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses was left unclear.398
An important change in the level of protection given to the free exercise
of religion occurred in 1963. Writing for the Court in Sherbert v. Verner,399
Justice Brennan stated strict scrutiny should apply when a law imposes a
burden on religious belief-based conduct. Under Sherbert, the Court applied
strict scrutiny to any burden on religious belief or conduct imposed by
law.400 While strict scrutiny was met in a number of cases following
Sherbert,401 a concern with how strict scrutiny might frustrate reasonable
government action led Justice Brennan to propose in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protection Association402 that only government actions burdening
beliefs “central” or “indispensable” to their religious practices should trigger
395. Id. at 162–67 (1878) (discussing how an offender cannot escape punishment merely
because of a religious belief that the law ought never to have been made).
396. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600–06 (1961).
397. Id. at 607–09.
398. Perhaps the better view would be that such a neutral, generally applicable law does not
trigger Free Exercise review at all. That would preserve the notion that any constitutional burden on
a fundamental right trigger something higher than minimum rationality review. Cf. Dist. of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628, 723 n.27 (2008) (explaining the review for Second Amendment right must
be higher than minimum rationality review because, like freedom of speech, a fundamental right is
involved).
399. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1973).
400. Id. at 403 (1973) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (emphasis added))
(“[A]ny incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling
state interest . . . .’”).
401. See Hernandez v. Comm’r of the IRS, 490 U.S. 680, 699–700 (1989) (requiring income
payment of income taxes for services the Church of Scientology provided satisfies strict scrutiny where
payment cannot reasonably be viewed as a charitable contribution, but rather as a fee for service);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254–60 (1982) (stating employers mandatory participation in Social
Security System satisfies strict scrutiny when challenged by Amish employer who has religious
objections to Social Security as undermining individual and community self-reliance principles of
Amish faith).
402. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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Sherbert’s strict scrutiny approach. To determine whether the belief is
central, Justice Brennan proposed the test would be whether the religious
adherent’s statement that the religious belief was central was sincerely
held.403
Based on a concern about strict scrutiny applying in too many cases, a
majority of the Court in 1990 changed Free Exercise doctrine in Employment
Division v. Smith.404 Under Smith, use of strict scrutiny in Free Exercise cases
does not extend beyond: (1) unemployment compensation cases involving
denial for refusing to work for religious reasons on one’s sabbath, based on
Sherbert v. Verner being settled law;405 (2) cases involving “hybrid” claims,
i.e., claims based on a conjunction of free exercise claims combined with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech, or, as in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 the right of parents to direct the education of their
children, where the related right would trigger strict scrutiny on its own;407
or (3) cases involving discrimination against religion, such as in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.408 The majority rejected the
attempt to limit Sherbert to religious beliefs central to the individual’s religion,
noting that “it is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular religious beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular
litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”409 A four-Justice concurrence

403. Id. at 475–76 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Lyng rejected this approach.
Id. at 456–58.
404. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (“The rule
respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from
civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind . . . .”).
405. Id. at 883–85 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963)).
406. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
407. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
408. Id. at 877 (providing the government may not “impose special disabilities on the basis of
religious views or religious status.”). A classic case of this kind is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525–28, 531–33 (1993). See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S.
at 525–28, 531–33 (explaining how a city adopting different rules regarding animal slaughter depending
on whether the slaughter was for meat-packing purposes or for a religious ceremony).
409. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 690, 699 (1989).
The Court added: “It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a
law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs.” Id. at 890.
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characterized Sherbert as requiring strict scrutiny “to justify any substantial
burden on religiously motivated conduct . . . .”410
Reacting to the Smith case, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).411 RFRA prohibits the “[g]overnment
[from] . . . substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”412 While this statute was ruled unconstitutional in Boerne v. Flores
as applied to state laws,413 it has been held as constitutional as applied to
federal laws.414
Since 1983, twenty-one states, most in the South and Southwest, have
passed similar state RFRAs applicable to the those states’ laws, and ten states
track that doctrine under their own state constitutions.415 A similar issue
arises under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA) which applied strict scrutiny to “substantial burdens” if
(1) that burden affects, or removal of that burden would itself affect,
interstate commerce; (2) the burden is imposed in a program or activity
410. Id. at 894–95 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgement). This language was based on dicta
in cases between 1963 and 1990 which adopted substantial burden language. See Hernandez, 490 U.S.
at 699 (citing Hobbie v. Unemp. Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141–43 (1987)) (“The free
exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a
central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the
burden.”); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981) (noting the burden
in the case was substantial); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217–20 (noting the burden in the case was substantial
and severe).
411. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(1–4)).
412. Id.
413. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516–36 (1997).
414. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424–25,
439 (2006) (discussing why Congress passed RFRA and its application to federal law).
415. See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (https://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx) [https://perma.cc/KKM42XMX] (showing twenty-one states have passed state RFRA statutes). Another ten states will trigger
strict scrutiny under their own state Constitutions, bringing the number to thirty-one states which will
apply a strict scrutiny approach for RFRA-like cases. Cf. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (1993),
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCL., https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1092/relig
ious-freedom-restoration-act-of-1993 [https://perma.cc/9K9V-BWYK] (“As a result of Boerne, a
number of states adopted their own “mini-RFRAs” to address free exercise claims in their court
systems.”). For a law firm focusing in religious liberty cases and analysis, see generally BECKET:
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FOR ALL, http://www.becketlaw.org [https://perma.cc/32J3-7U2E].
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receiving federal financial aid; (3) the burden is imposed in any regulation
permitting individual assessments of proposed property use; or (4) a
substantial burden on religious exercise of a person residing in or confined
to an institution that received federal financial assistance or affects
commerce with foreign Nations, among the several states, or with the Indian
tribes.416
The language in RFRA and RLUIPA, including use of the substantial
burden language, tracks Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Sherbert.417
Under RFRA and RLUIPA, the issue is presented how to determine a
substantial burden on conduct based on religious beliefs. As the Supreme
Court noted in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,418 “we must next ask
whether the HHS contraceptive mandate ‘substantially burden[s]’ the
exercise of religion.”
In Burwell, the majority provided little guidance on how to determine
whether a particular burden on religious belief is substantial.419 The Court
majority did note:
[P]roviding the coverage demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to
the destruction of an embryo [and this] belief implicates a difficult and
important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the
circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is
innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the
commission of an immoral act by another.420

While Justice Scalia, Thomas, and other conservatives rejected Brennan’s
sincerely held religious belief test in Lyng and Smith,421 once the substantial

416. Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803
(2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et. seq.).
417. See supra text accompanying note 410.
418. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
419. Id. at 719–20 (“We have little trouble concluding that it does. As we have noted, the Hahns
and Greens have a sincere religious belief that life begins at conception. They therefore object on
religious grounds to providing health insurance that covers methods of birth control that, as HHS
[Health & Human Services] acknowledges, may result in the destruction of an embryo. By requiring
the Hahns and Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate demands
that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”).
420. Id. at 724.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 402–03, 409.
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burden element was mandated by RFRA and RLUIPA, the majority seemed
to adopt such a sincerely held belief standard in Burwell.422
In contrast, the dissent in Burwell opted for the courts to apply some
version of a reasonable person standard. The dissent stated: “RFRA,
properly understood, distinguishes between ‘factual allegations that
[plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,’ which a court must
accept as true, and the ‘legal conclusion . . . that [plaintiffs’] religious exercise
is substantially burdened,’ an inquiry the court must undertake.”423 In the
absence of any further guidance from the Supreme Court, lower federal
courts have split on the issue of how to determine if a burden is substantial
between two tests, both versions of a reasonable person standard:
(1) whether the burden has to involve a religious exercise which is compelled
by the religion or otherwise forces the individual to a “stark choice”;424 or
(2) whether it is enough if the objection to following the government
regulations is “religiously motivated” or otherwise “important” to religious
practice by putting “substantial pressure” on an adherent to violate religious
beliefs.425 At some point, the Court will have to determine which of these
various approaches to substantial burden should be adopted, or create a
different test for determining substantial burdens on its own.426
The issue of whether a regular reasonable person definition or a sincerely
held religious beliefs should be the standard is also raised in the context of
the ministerial exception to government laws. In Our Lady of Guadalupe School

422. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014) (explaining rather than
“[a]rrogating the authority to provide a binding national answer to this religious and philosophical
question, we have . . . ‘[r]epeatedly and in many different contexts . . . have warned that courts must
not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim.” (citations omitted)).
423. Id. at 759 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679
(D.C. Cir. 2008)). In Burwell, the dissent concluded: “It is doubtful that Congress, when it specified
that burdens must be ‘substantia[l],’ had in mind a linkage thus interrupted by independent
decisionmakers (the woman and her health counselor) standing between the challenged government
action and the religious exercise claimed to be infringed.” Id. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
424. See United States v. Sterling, 75 M.J. 407, 417–19 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (discussing how the
claimant must show a religious exercise is important for free exercise of religions; adopted by Third,
Fourth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits).
425. Id. at 417–19 (option adopted by First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits).
426. The Court dodged that issue in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1159–60 (2016) (explaining
the compromise by the parties after oral argument in the case rendered decision unnecessary), vacating
Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. HSS, 801 F.3d 927, 937–42 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing how the Court initially
cited “important to religious practice” approach to determining substantial burden, but later applying
a sincerely held religious belief approach to decide the case).
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v. Morrissey-Berru,427 the Court extended Hosanna-Tabor’s ministerial
exception to the application of government laws to include virtually every
teacher in a religious school by focusing on the language in Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor that the “ministerial” exception should apply
to any employee who “serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, continued his view that the
Court should defer to a religious organization’s “good faith” view that any
employee, not just a teacher, is a “minister.”428 A two-Justice dissent
emphasized the breadth of the majority’s holding in exempting religious
organizations from employment discrimination laws regarding “race, sex,
pregnancy, age, disability, or other traits” or even “animus.”429 The dissent
said the focus should be on someone with more of an objective leadership
role within the church, as was true in Hosanna-Tabor.430
An issue also exists in determining whether religious discrimination is
sufficient to trigger the strict scrutiny standard under Smith, used in Hialeah,
both as to state laws burdening religious conduct431 and to government
spending programs limiting or denying the participation of religious
organizations.432 One solution is to adopt the approach used for race
427. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
428. Id. at 2069–70 (Thomas, J., concurring).
429. Id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Hosannna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012)).
430. See id. at 2073–75, 2081–82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s approach in
Hosanna-Tabor as well-rounded in analyzing objective factors to balance First Amendment concerns
and avoiding overbreadth).
431. See Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359,
364–66 (3d Cir. 1999) (positing a police department’s decision to provide medical exemptions to its
no-beard requirement, while refusing religious exemptions from same requirement, subject to
heightened scrutiny based on religious discrimination). See generally Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the U.S.
& Can. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (considering a city
ordinance prohibiting any person from performing direct oral suction as part of circumcision without
written signed consent triggers strict scrutiny as singling out religious practice, but remanded for trial
on whether ordinance is constitutional given state interest in preventing spread of herpes simplex virus
to male infants, which can be fatal due to their undeveloped immune systems).
432. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2283–88 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (stating blanket refusal to include religious schools in state scholarship program based on
Montana Constitution’s “no aid” to church provision violates Free Exercise Clause as discrimination
against religion based on “religious status” triggering strict scrutiny, as opposed to “use” of funds for
religious “training of clergy” in Locke; and the dissent describing how the case is more like Locke than
Trinity); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2017) (excluding
churches from a state program providing grants to non-profit organizations to purchase rubber
playground surfaces made from recycled tires constituted discrimination against religion; Locke
distinguished by noting the program there went “a long way toward including religion in its benefits”
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discrimination under Equal Protection Clause analysis: wherein only facial
discrimination based on religion433 or a finding that discriminatory intent
was a motivating factor behind the regulation434 is sufficient to trigger strict
scrutiny. A second approach, adopting a reasonable person definition of
discrimination, would ask whether discrimination existed considering the
“nature, extent, and likely impact” of the burden in a “large fraction of
relevant cases.”435 A result more favorable to religious entities would be to
conclude discrimination exists if any secular organization is given a benefit,
but that benefit is not extended to the religious organization.436
VII. ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
A. Conceptions v. Concepts
One issue concerning interpretation of a Constitutional provision based
on text, context, and history is determining the level of generality within
and only prevented using the funds to get a religious degree, a case raising greater Establishment Clause
concerns than use of recycled tires (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 724 (2004))).
433. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n.4, 9–11 (1967) (using race as a classification
mechanism in a statute triggers strict scrutiny).
434. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68, 270 n.21
(1977) (showing race was a motivating factor in the decision considering: (1) the impact or effect of
the official action; (2) the “historical background of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series of
official actions taken for invidious purposes[;]” (3) “legislative or administrative history, including the
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision[;]” any departures from normal
procedural practices; and any substantive departures, “particularly if factors usually considered
important by the decision-maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached[;]” and (4) any
other evidence of discriminatory motive; if the challenger can make a prima facie case of discriminatory
intent, the burden then shifts to the government to establish the same decision would have been made
even if the impermissible purpose had not been considered, and if the government fails to meet this
burden, strict scrutiny is triggered). Under this approach, the ability to foresee disparate impact because
of a law does not, without more, trigger a finding of discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1976) (positing how invidious discriminatory purpose can be inferred from
surrounding circumstances yet discriminatory impact is not dispositive); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (describing how discriminatory intent implies more than awareness
of consequences; it implies the action was taken “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
its adverse effects on an identifiable group”).
435. See supra text accompanying notes 382–86. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J, concurring) (“Similar or more severe restrictions
[related to COVID-19] apply to comparable secular gatherings.”).
436. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is not enough for the government to point out [] other secular organizations or
individuals are also treated unfavorably. The point ‘is not whether one or a few secular analogs are
regulated. The question is whether a single secular analog is not regulated.’” (quoting Douglas Laycock
& Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 22 (2016))).
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which text and “historical insights should be viewed.” For example, a judge
could remain focused on the specific examples the framers and ratifiers
seemingly held about a particular provision of the Constitution.437
Alternatively, a judge could focus on the general concept the framers and
ratifiers held about a provision.438 An intermediate position holds that
whether the interpreter should focus on the specific examples the framers
and ratifiers held about a provision, or their general concepts, depends on
the provision in question.439 To the extent a provision is “relatively direct,
specific, and focused,” this may suggest the framers and ratifiers intended
the provision to reflect only detailed, specific choices. If so, judges should
naturally remain focused on those choices. Where history suggests instead
that the framers and ratifiers embedded in the Constitution broad concepts,
like those dealing with the First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and
Due Process Clause, history may suggest the framers and ratifiers intended
“to provide no hard-and-fast answers . . . , and to let the answers develop
over time in common-law fashion.”440
As an example, Justice Kennedy stated in Lee v. Weisman,441 “the lesson
of history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause [is]
the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant
expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and
That concept would likely counsel a judge to find
coerce.”442
unconstitutional such practice as officially organized prayer in public
schools, despite the fact such prayer was a specific example framers and
ratifiers thought constitutional according to “historical practices and
understandings.”443
437. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26, at 116 nn.70, 72–74 (citing RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (discussing the focus on specific, discrete ideas or examples held by
individuals, such as the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment apparently did not specifically intend
to abolish segregation in the public schools)).
438. Id. at nn.71–73, 75, (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (explaining the
focus on more abstract concepts held by individuals, such as the intent by the framers and ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment to “establish a regime in which white and blacks received equal protection
of the laws[,]” which supports the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954))).
439. Id. at n.76, (citing Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 679 (1991)).
440. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 77, 79
(1993).
441. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
442. Id. at 591–92.
443. Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425–33 (1962) (describing school prayer
unconstitutional based upon “widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union
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Similarly, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted during her confirmation
hearing, the general concept of equality in the Declaration of Independence
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is broad
enough to embody a principle of equal rights for women, despite the fact
that the specific views of President Thomas Jefferson and others in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century were not ready for women to be equal
During her confirmation hearing,
participants in public life.444
Justice Ginsburg quoted Jefferson, who said that: “The appointment of
women to public office is an innovation for which the public is not
prepared. . . . Nor, . . . am I.”445 Nevertheless, as Justice Ginsburg noted,
she presumed if Jefferson were alive today he would have a different specific
view on the role of women in public life based on the general concept of
equality in which Jefferson believed—each individual’s equal and
unalienable right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”446
Additionally, sometimes changed social practice will require an individual
to change views because the general concept the individual believes interacts
with the social environment in a different way.
For example,
Justice Ginsburg has noted one of the main reasons the Supreme Court
changed its specific views in gender discrimination cases in the 1970s was
the Court’s newly-formed conclusion that the differential treatment of
women and men in certain statutes was “burdensome to women,” and thus
violated the Court’s concept of equality.447 She attributed this result in part
to the “[r]apid growth in women’s employment outside the home, attended
and stimulated by a revived feminist movement; [and] changing patterns of
marriage and reproduction[,]” all of which better allowed the Court to see
that women were being “unfairly constrained” by laws “ostensibly to shield

of Church and State” and “each separate government in this country should stay out of the business
of writing or sanctioning official prayers”), with id. at 445–50 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (positing voluntary
school prayer should be constitutional based upon specific “history of the religious traditions of our
people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our government”).
444. See The Supreme Court; Excerpts from Senate Hearings on Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1993, at A12, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/21/us/the-supreme-court-excerpts-fromsenate-hearings-on-the-ginsburg-nomination.html [https://perma.cc/YJG8-TE8N], cited in KELSO &
KELSO, supra note 26, at 196 n.94.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 L. &
INEQ. 17, 20 (1988) (emphasis in original).
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or favor” them. This result required an interplay among “change in society’s
practices, constitutional amendment, and judicial interpretation.”448
Such reasoning from general moral concepts to specific conclusions is, of
course, a mainstay of much philosophic inquiry, particularly in the
Enlightenment tradition. The goal of such reasoning is to convince “a
person who wishes, consistent with the [E]nlightenment tradition, to apply
consistently a general concept in which the individual believes[,]” that the
person “may have to adjust one or more specific views that currently are not
consistent with that general concept.”449 Through this process:
[A] dynamic is created whereby over time more of an individual’s specific
views will be a reflection of reasoned elaboration of general moral concepts
applied to current social [practices,] rather than [the individual’s] specific
views merely being the product of the individual’s past experiences,
unthinking adherence to [custom or] tradition, idiosyncratic preferences, or
prejudice.450

Given the normative approach of natural law and instrumentalist judges
to the nature of the judicial task, they are the most likely to embrace such
general use of concepts. This is particularly true for natural law judges, given
their special commitment to precedent and reasoned elaboration of the
law.451 Applied to constitutional interpretation, this process would require
the Court to adopt a reasoned elaboration of the general moral concepts
placed into the Constitution, such as the moral principles of equal protection
and due process of law.452

448. Id. at 17–20.
449. See R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke, but
the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1051, 1068
(1995) [hereinafter Kelso, Natural Law Tradition] (quoting R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional
Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American History, 29 VAL. U. L.
REV. 121, 135 (1994)).
450. Id. at 1068 (quoting Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 449, at 135). “This tension
between moral reasoning based upon reason versus adherence to custom or tradition is discussed in
greater depth [in THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] at §§ 15.4.1, 16.1–16.2.” KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 26, at 156–159 (2007).
451. Id. at 58–62 nn.93–106, 89 nn.87–89.
452. On “reasoned elaboration” of the law, see generally Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note
449, at 1080–85, discussing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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The majority and dissenting opinions in Bostock v. Clayton County453
illustrate the distinction between concepts and conceptions.454 In Bostock,
the majority interpreted the term “sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
1964’s ban on employment discrimination as including discrimination based
upon “homosexuality or transgender status.”455 The majority admitted
those “who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their
work would lead to this particular result,” but application of the “ordinary
public meaning” of the concept of “sex discrimination” logically applies when
discrimination is based on such status.456 One dissent focused on defining
“original public meaning” by looking to how “reasonable people at the time”
understood the specific applications of the statute, an approach focused on
conceptions of sex discrimination in 1964.457 A second dissent focused more
on the concept of the ordinary public meaning, but limited it to that concept
in 1964 and its consistent meaning for the next four decades.458 The
majority applied the concept of sex discrimination as it is understood today,
consistent with a focus on an evolved understanding of the concepts of
equality in Brown v. Board of Education459 and separation of church and state
in Lee v. Weisman, or modern views regarding gender discrimination.460
453. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
454. Id.
455. See id. at 1737 (“An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender
fires [the] person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex
plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”).
456. See id. at 1735, 1738, 1747, 1750 (“An employee violates Title VII when it intentionally
fires an individual employee based in part on sex[,]” relying in part on evolving understanding of sex
discrimination in Supreme Court cases after 1964 and rejecting an “expected applications” limit on
interpretation).
457. See id. at 1755, 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is imperative to consider how Americans in
1964 would have understood Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of sex . . . . Would they
have thought that this language prohibited discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender
identity?”).
458. See id. at 1824–34 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (focusing on the concept of sex
discrimination in the context of rejecting a “literal” dictionary definition approach).
459. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
460. See supra text accompanying notes 437–52 (discussing such an evolved understanding of
concepts). It is thus inaccurate to characterize the majority opinion in Bostock as adopting a literal
approach to interpretation. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1824–25 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (“Time and again, this Court has rejected literalism in favor of ordinary meaning.”).
Instead, a more accurate observation is that the majority adopted the ordinary public meaning of the
concept of sex discrimination as it has evolved from 1964 to today, rather than sticking with the
concept of sex discrimination in 1964 and for the next four decades thereafter. For a discussion such
an evolving approach to concepts is consistent with the original intent of how the framers and ratifiers
would have expected interpretation to involve, see infra text accompanying notes 461–66.
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B. Original Intent Versus Four Other Approaches
A focus on the contemporary meaning of a concept in interpretation is
consistent with an original intent approach to interpretation.461 “Two main
approaches appear in the popular literature on constitutional interpretation:
originalism and non-originalism.”462 An originalist approach asks how the
framers and ratifiers themselves anticipated interpretation of the
“A non-originalist approach bases the goal of
Constitution.463
constitutional interpretation [on] some justification independent of the
framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action.”464 Many judges and commentators
who claim to follow an “original intent” approach assume the same would
adopt a “fixed” or “static” model of interpretation, where the original public
meaning of the provision at the time of ratification is determinative of
constitutional meaning.465 What this approach misses is the emerging
complication if one concludes the framing and ratifying generation believed
in the model of a “living” Constitution. Where the evolving understanding
of a concept placed into the Constitution, or later legislative, executive, or
social practice, or judicial precedents could change the meaning of a
constitutional provision. In such a case, it would be faithful to the framers’
and ratifiers’ original theory of interpreting the Constitution differently
461. The discussion in this section is a summarized version of Kelso, supra note 132.
462. Id. at 114. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 241
(2009) (“For the last several decades, the primary divide in American constitutional theory has been
between those theorists who label themselves as ‘originalists’ and those who do not.”).
463. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 703, 703 (2009) (“By this they meant the sense intended by the people who wrote and
ratified it.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981)
(“Although the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive, the difficulties of
ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a
fair reflection of it.”).
464. Kelso, supra note 132, at 114; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its
Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1238–39 (2015) (noting
interpretation theories of purposivists, living constitutionalists, textualists, legislative intentionalists,
and originalists); Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193,
194 (2015) (“[N]oting approaches called ‘democracy–reinforcement, “moral readings,” minimalism, or
broad deference to political processes’ in addition to originalism” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kelso,
supra note 132, at 114 n.3)). “For a classic discussion of non-originalist approaches or, in his
terminology, ‘non-interpretivist’ approaches, see Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression,
and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 263-65 (1981).”). Kelso, supra note 132, at 114 n.3.
465. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
456 (2013) (discussing how “originalism” or “original intent” has two primary ideas, where a provision
is fixed at the time of framing and how people should be constrained by the provisions original
meaning).
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today than they would have interpreted it years ago. Overwhelming
evidence suggests the framers and ratifiers expected such a natural law
theory of interpretation to guide interpretation, and the framers and ratifiers
were not “positivists” who expected their fixed understandings to determine
constitutional meaning.466
Given this conclusion, some justification for a fixed or static approach to
interpretation must be given other than original intent. There are at least
four kinds of non-originalist arguments regarding constitutional
interpretation, including:
(1) consequentialist approach, which looks to the jurist’s own view as to the
best theory to yield the best consequences for society; (2) “a ‘current
consensus’ or ‘current majority’ or ‘Dworkian’ approach, which looks to what
theory of interpretation is best reflected in existing doctrine; (3) a ‘progressive
historicist’ approach, which looks to what theory of interpretation is most
likely to be reflected in the future, or what the ‘community eventually will
hold,’ if that can be determined; [or] (4) a ‘pluralist’ model of interpretation
reflecting some unspecified combination of original intent, consequentialist,
current majority, and progressive historicist reasoning.”467

As indicated, a consequentialist approach to interpretation decides what
is the best theory of interpretation to adopt. In the literature, at least four
reasons are used to support static constitutional interpretation. They are the
“(1) anti-evolutionary nature of a constitution; (2) judicial restraint;
(3) consistency with a written constitution; and (4) predictability.”468 At the
end of the day, each of these justifications fail in convincing that a fixed,
static interpretation is superior to following the original intent of the framers
and ratifiers in following a natural law theory of interpretation.469 Indeed,
466. See Kelso, supra note 132, at 129–56 (discussing this eighteenth century natural law
approach to interpretation and why a clear majority of the framers and ratifiers rejected any fixed, static,
positivist model of interpretation); see also Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 449, at 1053–64,
1068–69, 1074–79 (providing an “overview of the two traditions” and describing the “framers and
ratifiers as embodying the Enlightenment tradition.” (capitalization altered)).
467. Kelso, supra note 132, at 156–57.
468. Id. at 157–58.
469. See id. (discussing the “anti-evolutionary [n]ature” of a Constitution “versus [the] antimajoritarian nature of a Constitution) (capitalization altered); id. at 160–61 (discussing “[j]udicial
restraint versus [the] judicial role in protecting individual rights”) (capitalization altered); id. at 161–63
(discussing the “Constitution as a contract versus [the] Constitution as a Constitution”) (capitalization
altered); id. at 164–65 (discussing “static versus living original meaning in terms of predictability”)
(capitalization altered).
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the only certain conclusion one can reach is that a static, fixed model of
interpretation in the context of the United States Constitution would tend
to support locking in the traditional straight, white, affluent, male,
patriarchal values (what I call the SWAMP) of early generations of the
American power elite.470
The three other non-originalist approaches to interpretation have
problems of their own. For example, the “current consensus” or “current
majority” approach, which looks to what theory of interpretation is best
reflected in existing doctrine, “cannot . . . criticize the interpret[ation]
approach of another era” or “explain why the interpretative approach
should ever change.”471 “A ‘progressive historicist’ approach, which looks
to what theory of interpretation is most likely to be reflected in the future,”
will, in any event, end up supporting the natural law theory of
interpretation.472 “[A] ‘pluralist’ model of interpretation reflecting some
unspecified combination of original intent, consequentialist, current
majority, and progressive historicist reasoning” provides no real basis for
decision making except the judge’s own sense.473 In sum, the natural law

470. Id. at 165–70.
471. Id.
For example, the Supreme Court’s approach to race discrimination changed from 1896, when the
Court focused on existing customs and traditions to determine the reasonableness of legislation
requiring whites and non-whites to ride in separate railway cars in Plessy v. Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537
(1896)], to 1954, when the Court focused more on the reasoned demands of human dignity and
not treating any individual as a second-class citizen in Brown v. Board of Education[, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)]. From a current majority theory of justification, the Court could say after 1954 that race
discrimination cases should follow Brown, but would have no grounds to reject Plessy as
inappropriate for 1896 if the Plessy doctrine was consistent with legal doctrine then.
See generally Kelso, supra note 132, at 171–72.
472. Id. at 156.
Under a progressive historicist theory of interpretation, the focus of legal justification is on what
theory of interpretation is most likely to be reflected in the future. An approach based on
cognitive and moral developmental psychology suggests the views an enlightened community
“eventually will hold” will reflect a modern version of natural law. See generally KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 26, at 483–88 nn.71–81. The growing convergence among Western industrialized
democracies for judicial review based upon a modern version of natural law is consistent with
this view of progressive historicist reasoning.
See Kelso, supra note 132, at 172–73.
473. Id. at 156–57. For example, “Professor James Fallon has argued for his interpretation
theory on pluralist grounds.” Id. at 173. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1198–99, 1243–46, 1252–68 (1987).
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theory of interpretation best comports with original intent or any other
theory of interpretation one would adopt.474
VIII. CONCLUSION
Three recent related articles have discussed a predictable and principled
structure to make the rational basis, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny
tiers of review “more scientific.”475 This Article has focused on a concern
about the manipulability of which standard to apply by discussing: (1) a
principled approach to when the Court should apply a rational basis,
intermediate review, or strict scrutiny kind of review; and (2) why the
Court’s current approach is better than other competing alternatives.476
In pursuit of objective (1), Part II of this Article summarized the existing
standards of review. Part III then discussed the various factors the Supreme
Court uses to determine whether to apply a particular standard of review.
Part IV provided an analysis of why the Court’s current decision making
regarding what standard of review to apply is generally sound and defensible
as reflecting reasoned decision making.477
In pursuit of objective (2), Part V generally discussed why in the
American constitutional context the current standards of review approach
is better than other competing alternatives, such as a sliding scale approach
or a single-standard proportionality approach. Part VI then discussed how
a more explicit acknowledgment of a background commitment to reasoned
decision making would improve the Court’s current approach. Part
VII discussed why that commitment to reasoned decision making supports
interpretation based on the original meaning of the concepts used in the
While such an approach has the strength of being able to pick and choose among all the other
kinds of interpretation approaches how much emphasis to give each in various circumstances, it
has the weakness of not providing the judge with any guidance other than the judge’s own internal
balance. As John Hart Ely famously remarked, it is likely to be adopted by a person who is
“envisioning a Court staffed by Justices who think as they do.”
See Kelso, supra note 132, at 173.
474. See Kelso, supra note 132, at 174 (“[T]here are reasons to believe [] the natural law theory
described herein also represents the best moral theory from a consequentialist perspective, a current
consensus or Dworkian perspective, a progressive historicist perspective, and thus from a pluralist
perspective (since it reflects a combination of all the other perspectives).”).
475. See generally supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
476. This Article also suggested the current approach is consistent with the framers’ and
ratifiers’ original intent in terms of how the Constitution should be interpreted. See supra text
accompanying note 466.
477. See generally supra text accompanying notes 15–274.
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Constitution, and such interpretation reflects the original intent of the
Part VIII provided a brief conclusion.
framers and ratifiers.478
Appendix A, which follows, provides a summary of the seven basic
standards of review discussed in this Article. Appendix B provides a
summary of where those seven standards of review are used in the Court’s
constitutional doctrine.

478. See generally supra text accompanying notes 275–474.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Rational Review: Under rationality review, the regulation must be “rationally
related to legitimate government interests.” Substantial deference is given to
government, as in Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993) (“[A]
classification ‘must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification.’”).
2nd-Order Reasonableness Review: As phrased in Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (addressing an “individual’s right to vote and his right
to associate with others . . . .”) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 788–89 (1983)):
A court . . . must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into
consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden
the plaintiff’s rights. . . . “[R]easonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions . . . are
generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428.

This test is different from rational review in a number of ways. First, in
Burdick the Court is limited to the “precise interests put forward by the
State,” not “any reasonably conceivable interest.” Id. at 428. Second,
Burdick represents a “reasonableness balancing” concerned with the extent
of the statute’s benefits versus the amount of the burden placed on the
individual. Part of this balance, as stated in Burdick, involves the Court
considering less burdensome alternatives to determine “the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. at 428.
The only issue under rational review is whether the burden on the individual
is rational. Third, as stated in Burdick, the court does the balancing of benefit
and burdens to determine the reasonableness of the government action, not
substantial deference to government. Fourth, despite the Court determining
for itself the extent to which the alleged governmental interests are actually
supported by fact, some deference to governmental judgment is still given
under “reasonableness balancing.” See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
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413–14 (1989) (review “is not toothless” but prison officials must “be given
broad discretion to prevent . . . disorder); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 439 (1976) (under procedural due process balancing “substantial
weight [will] be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged
by Congress with . . . administration . . . .”).
Additional Matters: The challenger bears the burden of proving
unconstitutionality under rational review and 2nd-order reasonableness
balancing. In contrast, under strict scrutiny, intermediate review, or 3rdorder reasonableness balancing, the government bears the burden of
justifying its action. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996) (strict
scrutiny); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 529 (1996) (intermediate
review); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 572
n.4 (1968) (3rd-order reasonableness balancing). At strict scrutiny only
“actual” governmental purposes can be used. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899, 908 n.4 (1996) (“actual purpose.”). At intermediate review “actual” or
“plausible” interests may be considered to justify the statute. See generally
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 26 at 1103–04 nn.92–99. Under reasonableness
balancing, conceivable, but implausible, reasons can be used if “put forward
by the government in litigation”; at rational review “any reasonably
conceivable” government interest can be used, even one made up by the
Court during litigation. See id. For more in-depth discussion of rational
review and reasonableness balancing, see Kelso, supra note 2.
3rd-Order Reasonableness Review: The test under 3rd-order reasonableness
review is the same as under 2nd-order reasonableness review. The difference
is the government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
government action. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 572 n.4 (free speech of
government workers on matters of public concern).
Intermediate Review: Under intermediate review, government action must
be “substantially related to advancing substantial government interests.” See
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989). As discussed
in Kelso, supra note 4, six questions are asked at intermediate review:
Regarding Ends: (1) Is government advancing substantial (important
or significant) ends?
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Means to Achieve Ends: (2)(a) Is the government action “substantially
underinclusive” in failing to regulate individuals who are part of some
problem (the under inclusiveness inquiry); and (2)(b) Does the government
action “substantially serve” to achieve its benefits on those whom the
statute does regulate (the service inquiry);
Burdens Imposed by Government: (3)(a) Is the government action
“substantially more burdensome than necessary” in imposing burdens
on individuals who are not part of the problem (the over inclusiveness
inquiry); (3)(b)(i) Is the government action “substantially more
burdensome than necessary” on individuals who are properly regulated
(restrictiveness inquiry); (3)(b)(ii) Even if not, does the government action
leave open ample alternative channels of expression (oppressiveness
inquiry)?
Intermediate Review with Bite: Intermediate Review for Ends, Burdens;
Strict Scrutiny Means. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
Loose Strict Scrutiny Review: Strict Scrutiny for Ends, Means; Intermediate
Review Burdens. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996).
Strict Scrutiny Review: Under strict scrutiny review, government action
must be “necessary to advance compelling governmental interests” and
must be “narrowly drawn.” See Simon & Shuster, Inc., 502 U.S. 105, 119–
20 (1991). As discussed in Kelso, supra note 5, six questions are asked at
strict scrutiny:
Regarding Ends: (1) Is government advancing compelling (or
overriding) ends?
Means to Achieve Ends: (2)(a) Is the government action “unnecessarily
underinclusive” in failing to “directly regulate” individuals who are part
of some problem (the under inclusiveness inquiry); and (2)(b) Does the
government action “substantially serve” to achieve its benefits on those
whom the statute does regulate (the service inquiry);
Burdens Imposed by Government: (3)(a) Is the government action
“the least burdensome effective alternative” in imposing burdens on
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individuals who are not part of the problem (the over inclusiveness
inquiry); (3)(b)(i) Is the government action the “least burdensome
effective alternative” on individuals who are properly regulated
(restrictiveness inquiry); (3)(b)(ii) Even if the “least burdensome effective
alternative” does the government action leave open ample alternative
channels of expression (oppressiveness inquiry).
The Supreme Court also uses the phrase “least restrictive . . . effective
alternatives” to describe this “least burdensome effective alternative”
requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729 (2012).
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 1: LEVELS OF REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT ACTION:
THE “BASE PLUS SIX” MODEL OF REVIEW*

Level of Scrutiny

Gov’t Ends or
Interests to be
Advanced

Statutory Means to Ends
Relationship
to Benefits

Relationship
to Burdens

Typical Areas
Where Used

I. “Base” or “Standard” Rational Review
(Three Requirements are Separate Elements to Meet)
Standard Rational
Review: Burden on
challenger to prove
unconstitutionality

Legitimate
(substantial
deference to
government)

Rational
(substantial
deference to
government)

Not Irrational
(substantial
deference to
government)

[Does government have “rational basis” to act]

Standard Social or
Economic
Regulation:
Williamson v. Lee
Optical; Heller v. Doe
Aliens: Illegal; Job
Part of
Democracy;
Federal Regulation
Contract Clause:
Energy Reserves

II. The “Plus Six” Standards of Increased Scrutiny
A. Heightened Rational Review
(Reasonableness Balancing of Means & Ends, Not Separate Elements)
“Second-Order
Reasonableness
Review”: Burden on
challenger to prove
unconstitutionality

Legitimate Ends “Reasonable” Given Means

Dormant
Commerce Clause:
Pike
Contract Clause:
U.S.
Trust/Spannaus

(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

Takings Clause:
Penn Central
Punitive Damages:
BMW v. Gore

[Balance government interests & availability of less
burdensome alternatives v. burdens on persons]
[some deference to government]

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss4/4

Less than
Substantial
Burdens on
Unenumerated
Fundamental
Rights
Proc. Due Process:
Mathews test
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Typical
Areas
Where Used

II. The “Plus Six” Standards of Increased Scrutiny
A. Heightened Rational Review
(Reasonableness Balancing of Means & Ends, Not Separate Elements)
“Third-Order
Reasonableness
Review”:
Burden on
Government

Legitimate Ends “Reasonable” Given Means
(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

[Same as Second-Order Review, except the burden
shifts to the government to justify its action: Burden
remains on government for all higher levels of review]

Dormant
Commerce
Clause: Maine
v. Taylor
Takings
Clause: Dolan
v. Tigard

B. Intermediate Review Standards
(Three Requirements are Separate Elements to Meet)
Intermediate
Review

Intermediate
Review with
Bite

Substantial/
Important/
Significant

Substantial/
Important/
Significant
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Substantially
Related

Directly and
Substantially
Related

Not Substantially
More
Burdensome
Than Necessary
& Ample
Alternatives

Not Substantially
More
Burdensome
Than Necessary
& Ample
Alternatives

Gender
Discrimination
Illegitimacy
Alien Children:
Plyler v. Doe
Art. IV, sec. 2
Priv. & Imm.
Clause

Commercial
Speech:
Central
Hudson
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Level of Scrutiny

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

Gov’t Ends
or Interests
to be
Advanced

Statutory Means to Ends
Relationship
to Benefits

Relationship
to Burdens

[Vol. 52:973

Typical Areas
Where Used

II. The “Plus Six” Standards of Increased Scrutiny
C. Strict Scrutiny Standards (Three Requirements are Separate Elements to Meet)
Loose Strict
Scrutiny

Compelling/
Overriding

Directly and
Substantially
Related

Not
Substantially
More
Burdensome
Than
Necessary &
Ample
Alternatives

Racial
Redistricting:
Bush v. Vera

Strict Scrutiny
Review

Compelling/
Overriding

Directly and
Substantially
Related

Least
Restrictive
Effective
Alternative &
Ample
Alternatives

Race, Ethnicity,
National Origin
Aliens: State
Regulation of
Lawful Aliens
Not Involving
Democracy
Substantial
Burden on
Unenumerated
Fundamental
Right

*

For a discussion of each of the elements of these standards of review, see Appendix A.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss4/4
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TABLE 2: LEVELS OF REVIEW UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
THE “BASE PLUS SIX” MODEL OF REVIEW

Level of Scrutiny

Gov’t Ends
or Interests
to be
Advanced

Statutory Means to Ends
Relationship
to Benefits

Relationship
to Burdens

Typical Areas
Where Used

I. “Base” or “Standard” Rational Review
(Three Requirements are Separate Elements to Meet)
“Minimum
Rational Review”:
Burden on
challenger to
prove
unconstitutionality

Legitimate
(substantial
deference to
government)

Rational
(substantial
deference to
government)

Not Irrational
(substantial
deference to
government)

[Does government have “rational basis” to act]

If No Free
Speech Review
(see supra note
256), then only
Williamson v. Lee
Optical review
under Due
Process or Heller
v. Doe review
under the Equal
Protection Clause

II. The “Plus Six” Standards of Increased Scrutiny
A. Heightened Rational Review
(Reasonableness Balancing of Means & Ends, Not Separate Elements)
“Second-Order
Reasonableness
Review”: Burden
on challenger to
prove
unconstitutionality

Legitimate Ends “Reasonable” Given Means

(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

[Balance government interests & availability of less
burdensome alternatives v. burdens on persons]
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Non-Public
Forum: SubjectMatter or
Content-Neutral
Regulations
Gov’t Grants,
Subsidies,
Trademark
Defamation and
Related Torts
Less than
Substantial
Burdens on
Freedom of
Assembly/
Association

95

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 4, Art. 4

1068

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

Level of
Scrutiny

Gov’t Ends or
Interests to be
Advanced

Statutory Means to Ends
Relationship
to Benefits

Relationship
to Burdens

[Vol. 52:973

Typical Areas
Where Used

II. The “Plus Six” Standards of Increased Scrutiny
A. Heightened Rational Review
(Reasonableness Balancing of Means & Ends, Not Separate Elements)
“Third-Order
Reasonableness
Review”: Burden
on Government

Legitimate Ends “Reasonable” Given Means
(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

(no substantial
deference to
government)

[Same as Second-Order Review, except the burden
shifts to the government to justify its action:
Burden remains on government for all
higher levels of review]

Government
Employees on
Matters of
Public
Concern:
Pickering
Commercial
Speech:
Zauderer

B. Intermediate Review Standards
(Three Requirements are Separate Elements to Meet)
Intermediate
Review

Substantial/
Important/
Significant

Substantially
Related

Not
Substantially
More
Burdensome
Than
Necessary &
Ample
Alternatives

Public Forum:
Content-Neutral
Regulations of
Speech: O’Brien
Broadcast TV
and Radio:
Red Lion
Campaign
Contributions:
McConnell
Campaign
Disclosure
Regs.: Reed

Intermediate
Review with Bite

Substantial/
Important/
Significant

Directly and
Substantially
Related

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss4/4

Not
Substantially
More
Burdensome
Than
Necessary &
Ample
Alternatives

Commercial
Speech:
Central Hudson
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Typical Areas
Where Used

II. The “Plus Six” Standards of Increased Scrutiny
C. Strict Scrutiny Standards (Three Requirements are Separate Elements to Meet)
Loose Strict
Scrutiny

Compelling/
Overriding

Directly and
Substantially
Related

Not Substantially
More
Burdensome
Than Necessary
& Ample
Alternatives

Content-Based
Regulations of
Cable/Satellite
TV and Radio:
Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm.
(Breyer, J.,
plurality
opinion)

Strict Scrutiny
Review

Compelling/
Overriding

Directly and
Substantially
Related

Least Restrictive
Effective
Alternative &
Ample
Alternatives

Public Forum:
Content-Based
Regulations of
Speech
All Viewpoint
Discrimination

Free Exercise: Employment Division v. Smith: Strict Scrutiny for
discrimination against religion, hybrid cases, or precise facts of Sherbert v.
Verner; otherwise, Rational Review

Establishment Clause: Categorically barred if fail test for violation of
Clause
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Campaign
Finance
Expenditures:
Citizens United
(2010)
Substantial
Burdens on
Freedom of
Assembly/
Association
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